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work of Erich Fromm, David Riesman, and David Potter. 
APPROUEO BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: 
Bernard U, Burke 
Ann Weikel 
Charlee Bolton 
Thl9 theeie examlnee the study of national character thr~ugh 
the work of the psychologist Erich Fromm, the sociologist David 
Rles1an, and the historian David Potter. Above al I I Intend to 
provide a critical exegesis of the three thinkers. wi I I relate 
them to one another by discussing the Interconnections In their 
thought, beginning with Fromm's social psychological theory of 
2 
character, turning to Ries1an 1 s theory of sociology and, finally, 
Potter's theory of A•erican history. Each, I argue, •uet be studied 
in the context his ti1e--above all the cl l1ate of horror and 
uncertainty at 1id-century. 
Fro11, a Jew, fled Ger1any in the 1930s convinced that he was 
witnessing a decline Into a new age of barbarism. Thereafter, he 
struggled 1ith the problem of good and evil in a world nakedly evi I. 
Recurrent In hie work le the the1e of hope in a world beyond hope. 
Heither world 1ar nor genocide could persuade him to give up hope 
and to succu1b to pessi1is1. The task of his social psychology, 
then, was to explain the trlu1ph of hu1an 1lckedness in order to 
inspire faith in hu1anity. Hie theory of character did this. He 
explained hu1an character, the determinant of behavior, as a purely 
social pheno1enon. Thus, he 1as able to reason that the origins of 
evil •ere social. Society, not 1an, 1ae the source of evi I in the 
world. 
Fro11 1as concerned 1ith the character of modern man which he 
understood as social character. Remarkably, he did not single out 
the Ger1an character for conde1nation in his analysis. He treated 
It, rather, as a 1anifestation of what 1ae developing al I over the 
1orld as a consequence of global socioeconomic development. He 
understood the rise of Hazlem ae one consequence of the modern man's 
confor•ist and ulti1ately destructive character. 
Fro11's social psychology influenced Riesman's approach in his 
historically oriented Inquiry into the American character. In many 
respects Rles1an'e sociology was Fro11'e social psychology 
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A1ericanized. Ries1an's principal concern, however, was not the 
fate of good in the world but, rather, the fate of individual ls1 In 
McCarthy's Cold Uar A1erica. By e1phasizin9 individual Ism Riesman 
departed fro1 the severity of Fro11's social determinism. Riesman's 
concept of autono1y celebrated individualism and suggested In ter1s 
of character the transcendence of ti1e and place, something not 
i1agined by Fro11. Ries1an understood character as a product of 
society's influence against 1hich individuals could 1ount 
resistance. 
David Potter, influenced by Ries1an's study of the American 
character, pursued the the1e of A1ericanis1. Potter's work 
expresses throughout his self-consciousness as an American. A 
Southerner born in 1910, Potter 1as a1are of the contradiction, 1ore 
apparent than real, involved In being both a Southerner and a 
A1erican. The Idea of character, I inked as It was by Fromm and 
subsequently Riesman to socioeconomic conditions, enabled Potter to 
write about an A1erican character that encompassed the South as wel I 
as the Horth. In his 1ork on the A1erlcan character Potter redefined 
the historical perspective of David Rlesman. 
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CHAPTER I 
IHTROOUCTIOH 
The study of the national character 1as a central feature of 
post Uorld Uar II Intellectual history. It 1as a project Involving 
all of the branches of social science--history, psychology, 
sociology, anthropology, econo1lcs, and pol It I cal science. The 
focus here Is on the 1ork of three 1en--the psychologist Erich 
Fro11, the sociologist David Rles1an, and the historian David 
Potter. 
The 1odern study of natlonal character blosso1ed In the late 
1930s and began to bear fruit In the 19i0s. Tio forces, one 
Intellectual and other social and polltlcal, converged to 1ake this 
period ripe for the study of national character. Fro1 one direction 
there ca1e an Intellectual stl1ulus that 1ould carry the study of 
national character Into the decade of the forties and beyond. Fro• 
the other ca1e a sense of purpose. Intellectually, the 1930s 
1ltnessed the first graftlngs of psychological theory onto the 
anthropological study of national character. Morally as 1ell as 
polltlcally, the ascendancy of the great dictators, Hitler, 
Mussolini, and Stal in 1arked the period. 
The specter of barbarls1 that hovered over the 1orld, say, 
fro1 1935 to 1955 1ade the study of national character an urgent 
aatter. There was a desire to understand the rise of Hazism, the 
Second Uorld Uar, the Holocaust, and the Cold Uar with its 
01nipresent threat of nuclear annihilation. The obvious and 
understandable need to know one's ene•ies and one's friends 1as a 
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key l1petus for national character studies. But there were other 
1otives as 1ell. A strand of ideal is• was involved. So1e hoped 
that a clear understanding of differences in national character 
would aid the long-ter1 cause of peace a1ong nations. There was 
also a feeling in the Uest that freedo• was under siege. How better 
to deal 1ith the threat of totalitarianism than to understand the 
psychology of the 1asses being convulsed by the ti1es? Pro1inent 
a1ong atte1pts to co1prehend the nature of mass movements was Erich 
Fro11' s E~t."!f1Pti' !i"t.?JI fi~"dt.w. But there were others such as the 
ana I yses of Theodore Adorno in l~ Ruthe."11,itm,ian Pl!frse.mol itg , 
Hannah Arendt in Th" DI, lg lntt ,,, I lt.7f o I lt t1r hm ls•, and the Amer i can 
stevedore Eric Hoff er in TM 11,w. &I /,,(If!'/,, So, in part, the study 
of national character developed as a response to world crisis. 
As Alex lnkles and Daniel Levinson observed, the study of 
national character stands at the "interface of individual psychology 
and the social sciences.•1 Traditionally, social anthropologists 
did 1ost of the 1ork in this field. Prior to the 1id-1930s, the 
study of national character consisted 1oetly of descriptive studies 
of social nor1s and biographical sketches. It was aseu1ed that 
1Afex lnkles and Daniel J. Levinson, "Hational Character: the 
Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Syste1s, 0 Thd llr.1ndbook 
of Socio/ Psychology, 2nd ed., ed., Gardner Lindzey and El I iot 
Aronson (Reading, Mass: Addison-Uesley, 1969), 418. 
,. 
.) 
individuals "internalized cultural values," but for the most part 
"syste1atic psychological theory •as ignored."2 
By 193i when Ruth Bened i ct pub I i shed A1t t ~rns rd tu It"',~ i t 
was beco1ing clear, however, that the study of national character 
was undergoing change. Benedict, applying the concept of 
"psychological coherence," began looking into the psychological 
functions of 1hole cultures and the institutions comprising the1. 
The psychological functions of institutions, according to the 
anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer, "are the basic data for the analysis 
of national character."3 The study of national character assumed 
that social and cultural institutions affect Individual psychology. 
Benedict recognized that the institutions of a given culture 
functioned to the same end, the integration of individuals into 
society. Though lacking a developed theory of individual 
psychology, Benedict's work was the foundation of further inquiry 
into the link between culture and personality. Put simply, national 
character was understood to be the connection between culture and 
persona Ii ty . 
The basic proble1 posed by the study of national character, 
one left open to endless debate, concerns the degree to which social 
and cultural factors deter1ine or condition the personalities of 
people. This shared personality that constitutes national character 
has been called a nu1ber of things, such as "social character," 
2lbid., i19. 
3Geoffrey Gorer, •Hational Character: Theory and Practice," 
Thl!I Studg of Culture t7t t1 Distont~e, ed., Margaret Mead and Rhoda 
Metraux (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953) , 66. 
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•basic personality,• and •1odal personality.• I 1i II use the ter1 
•social character• because Fro11, Ries1an, and Potter did. The 
study of national character presupposed that people acquire In 
co11on a distinctive personality according to the ti1e and place of 
their birth. To the extent that national, social, and cultural 
boundaries overlapped, national character 1as •social character.• 
States 1hich 1ere conglo1erations of nationalities such as the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia caused proble1s for this sort of 
analysis. Also, the idea of national character tested the notion of 
an A1erican •1elting pot.• Does a nation of i11igrants such as the 
United States acquire a distinctive character? I believe that the 
assu1ption of an A1erican character proved fruitful. 
The 1ork of Fro11, Ries1an, and Potter for• three stages of a 
chapter in the story of the pursuit of the A1erican character. 
Ries1an and Potter in particular 1ade direct and significant 
contributions to this inquiry. I begin 1ith Fro11 because his 
psychological theory of social character and his characterization of 
1odern 1estern 1an underlay Ries1an's study of the A1erican 
character. Potter's 1ork, in turn, developed fro1 Ries1an's. 
Erich Fro11 had a significant Influence upon the develop1ent 
of national character studies. He, along 1ith others such as Abra1 
Kardiner and Ralph Linton, developed theories of Individual 
psychology that stressed environ1ental over biological factors and 
served as the foundation for national character studies. Fro11 1 s 
definition of •social character,• ho1ever, 1as stricter in ter1s of 
culture-personality nexus than either Linton's concept of •1odal 
s 
personality• or Kardiner's concept of •basic personality.• Fro11 
understood social character as a social necessity. Society required 
a certain type of character In order to function properly, and thus 
deviation fro• an established nor1 suggested social dysfunction. 
Linton's use of the the statistical concept of 1ode, as lnkles and 
Levinson noted in their concise su11ary of the study of national 
character, took into account the possibility of variety a1ong 
individual personalities and •patternings in any society.•i It 
see1s as though the existence of several statistically relevant 
personality types in a society •ould discount the very existence of 
a •national• character for that society. Like1ise, Kardiner's idea 
of •basic personality• referred to the type of personality that •as 
•1ost congenial to the prevailing institutions and ethos of the 
society.•5 Thus in his understanding of social character as a 
functional prerequisite for a society Fro11 carved out a distinct 
position. 
On the basis of his understanding of social character, Fro11 
conducted a broad inquiry into the character of •estern 1an, 
believing that there •as a consistent pattern of social and econo1ic 
develop1ent throughout the Uest. His concern 1as al1ays the plight 
of 1estern 1an. Modern psychology, according to Fro11, revealed the 
central i1portance of •interpersonal relationships• in the for1ation 
of personality, and the study of the social basis of personality 
(the study of character) Inferred personality fro1 behavior. Fro11 
ifnkles and Levinson, 121. 
51bid., 121. 
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distinguished bet1een the social and the biological areas of 
personality. He •as concerned only •ith the social part of 
personality, and he discounted the i1portance of other aspects of 
personality. He labeled the social side of personal lty character, 
and he believed that behavior 1as reflective of character. Fro11 
devised several character orientations in order to show how 
different sorts of behavior 1ere reflective of different characters. 
Fro11 bel leved that by understanding how people related to others 
and also the 1orld one learned about their character, that Is 1ho, 
essentially, they were. In ter1s of hu1an conduct character, and 
character alone, 1as for Fro11 ethically significant. Thus Fro11 
believed that the troubles of the 1orld had soc I al origins. It 
follo•ed then that the source of 1an's proble1s 1as the organization 
of his society, and Fro11 thought that psychology applied to the 
task of social organization could solve 1an's proble1s. Rt the ti1e 
Fro11 •as •riting the proble1s confronting 1an 1ere 1ar and 
genocide. 
The beginning point of Fro11's •science of 1an• 1as his 
understanding of hu1an nature, 1hich he presupposed 1as 
•characteristic of the hu1on species.• Heither fixed nor infinitely 
1al leable, hu1an nature, he held, 1as adaptable. In retrospect It 
see1s also to have been benign and ineffective. Man was a naturally 
good creature living in a dreadful 1orld. But out of the necessity 
of having to adapt, ion had beco1e dreadful as 1el I. Fro11 1ent on 
to distinguish bet1een virtuous and vicious characters as 1ell as 
sane and Insane societies, distinctions based upon his understanding 
hu•an nature. His only hope for the future was a transfor•ation of 
the world. Paradoxically, It see•s, •an the vlcti• was to beco•e 
the shaper of a ne1 1orld. Throughout, the subject of Fro•1's 
inquiry 1as •1an,• and his e•phasis 1as upon the urgency of his 
dile11a. 
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David Ries1an 1as 1ore Interested in the plight of Individuals 
than of 1ankind. Autono1ous individuals 1ere his heroes; and as 
Rles1an l1agined the1, the autono1ous 1ere beleaguered In the 
1odern, corporate, bureaucratized 1orld of the t1entleth century. A 
desire to understand his 01n tl1es led David Ries1an to contrast 
today's A1ericans to those of yesterday. Like Fro11, ho1ever, he 
believed that A1ericans could be understood along the sa1e I Ines as 
other western peoples. This broader analysis 1as, in retrospect, 
al1ost superfluous to his hand I Ing of A1erican character. Thus I 
regard his 1ork as essentially a study of the A1erican character. 
The perception of a difference bet1een what history told hi1 
about past A1ericans and 1hat he sa1 In his conte1poraries inspired 
Ries1an's study of the A1erican character. Fro11ian psychology, by 
linking character to social structure aa It did, provided Ries1an 
11th a 1ay of explaining differences he perceived bet1een t1entieth-
century A1erlcans and their nineteenth-century counterparts. 
Ries1an 1as able to link the transfor1ation of A1erican society to 
the develop1ent of the A1erican character. In au1, the differences 
bet1een A1erica as an industrializing society and A1erica as a 
conau•er society ape I led out the changes in the A•erican character. 
The change In the A1erican character fro1 •inner-directed• to 
8 
•other-directed• paralleled the transition of A1erica fro1 a society 
of production to a society of consuaption. The point of reference 
for hi1self as well as his critics In his discussion of the R1erlcan 
character was Alexis de Tocqueville, 1ho fro• Ries1an and others 
gained 1uch currency In the 1950s. The revltallzatlon of 
Tocqueville during this period was natural, given intellectuals' 
heightened concern 1ith the A1erican character. The the1e of the 
R1erican character, though it stretched back beyond Tocquevl lie to 
Crevecoeur, 1as rooted in the for1er's discussion of D~•t~~r0t~ in 
~icoduring the age of Jackson. 
Ries1an's insightful descriptions of the A1erican character at 
1id-century influenced David Potter. Beginning 1ith Ries1an 1 s 
sketch of the t1entieth-century national character, Potter sought to 
uncover its historical roots. He exa1ined 1ore closely the 111 leu 
in 1hich the R1erican character developed and elaborated upon 
Riesaan 1 s historical perspective. Potter, too, harkened back to 
Tocqueville, e1phasizing abundance as a factor in the for1ation of 
A1erican character. His thesis 1as that the A1erican character had 
been conditioned by 1aterlal plenty. living in a spacious and 
bountiful envlronaent Aaericans had developed attitudes and 
institutions that betrayed the luxury of I lving in a land of plenty. 
A1ericans, according to Potter, equated freedo1 and equality 1ith 
opportunity. Aaericans cherished the opportunity to get 1ealthy as 
a birthright, and, he said, they did so at the expense of other 
values. A1ericans sacrificed security and the sense of belonging 
that co1es 1ith assured status in order to pursue their personal 
fortune. They •ere out•ardly confor•ist and in•ardly distressed. 
Like Ries•an's other-directed character and Fro••'s consu•er 
oriented character, the •odern A•erican in Potter's esti•ation •as 
lonely and anxious. 
Three chapters fol lo•. Chapter one discusses Fro••'s 
psychology and his study of character. Chapter t10 addresses 
Ries•an's analysis of the A•erlcan character. Chapter three deals 
11th Potter's Interpretation of the A•erlcan character. I end 1ith 
a conclusion about the place of their 1ork In history. 
* * * 
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CHAPTER 11 
ERICH FROMM 
Erich Fro11 spent his llfe trying •to understand the la1s that 
govern the I lfe of the lndluldual 1an, and the la1s of society--
that Is, of 1en and their social exlstence.•1 In his approach he 
1as part cassandra and part pollyanna. He described a present 
1lthout hope 1hl le he anticipated a future 1lthout despair. It Is 
as though he 111 led optl1ls1 In order to escape hopelessness, as 
though he 1as convinced that by refusing to concede real lty he could 
alter reallty. He 1as convinced that real lty 1as 1retched and 
1odern 1an's existence insane, yet he placed 1an beyond reproach and 
bel leved hi1 capable of perfection. At the center of Fro11's 1ork 
1as this conflict bet1een pessl1ls1 and optl1ls1. The urgency of 
his 1essage arose out of this conflict. The pessl1lst told his 
readers they 1ere dead 1hlle the optl1lst Insisted they could 
overco1e death.2 Thus to understand Fro11 one 1ust real lze that his 
1 Aa I ner Funk, Er I ch Fro••: Th" Courog" to bl!' Hu•on, , it h o 
po8t8crlpt /Jy Erich Fro•• {He1 York: The Conti nuu1 Pub I I sh i ng 
Co1pany, 1982), 3, citing Erich Fro11, 6t1yond th" Choin~ of 
/I lu:tion: h'y Encountt1r ,/th llorx ond Frt1ud {He1 York: SI ion and 
Schuster, Credo Series, 1962), n.p. 
2Erich Fro11, !ha Sona Soclaty (He1 York: Rinehart & Co1pany 
Inc., 1955), 360. 
11 
thought was strung taut between two profound convictions, the 
ugliness of hu1an existence and the subll1lty of hu1an nature. 
So1ehow Fro11 was able to disassociate the ghastly design fro1 its 
architect and conde1n society while lavishing 1an with praise. His 
analysia of the relationship between 1an and society developed 
around this good 1an-evil society paradox. As psychologist, 
sociologist, philosopher, and crusader Fro11 sought to understand 
life's tragic experiences, to discover 1eaning in an age absorbed in 
the absurd, and 1ost i1portantly to resolve the conflict between 
good and evil in favor of the good. 
His a1bition was no less than to save hu1anity. This is 
evident in his three 1ost widely known books, £~cap~ fro• F~~d,,. 
( 1911), /Ian f,,.,,, Hla:t"I I ( 1917), and T!hf .. ~ St7t.~l~tg ( 1955). 
believe that the three books explore the sa1e the1es and elaborate a 
consistent philosophy. Therefore, I treat the1 as pieces of a 
larger work which offered a penetrating analysis of the proble1 of 
evil in the 1odern world. Psychology was Fro11's tool of analysis. 
Psychology, he argued, could explain the nature of evi I and 1ap the 
way to a world beyond evil. E~cclPt' Frt"la F~t'dt,. analyzed what Fro11 
perceived as 1odern 1an's hostility to his newly won freedo1 fro• 
the arbitrary rule of kings. Uith freedo1 ca1e frightening 
responsibilities. Over1hel1ed by anxiety, 1an, Fro11 believed, 1as 
retreating into authoritarian syste1s. Plainly, Fro11 was 
confronting the night1are of Hazi Ger1any. Though he left Ger1any 
I n the 1930s, i t was i 1poss i b I e for h i 1, a Jew, to shut out the 
1acabre vision of Hazis1. The book tried to explain the 
socioecono1ic origins of 1odern 1an's confor1ist and ulti1ately 
destructive character which he believed was responsible for the 
slaughter of iii lions and the destruction of civilization. In one 
sense E~~C1P'f lrt-w F/'f!ffMA-w can be understood as an account of how 
good 1en co11it genocide, perhaps even as an apology for good 1en 
who perpetrate evil. 
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Of course it was never Fro11's intention to write apologetics, 
but it see1s to have been inherent in the paradox of good 1en in an 
evil society. Six years after £~cop~ fro• Fr~~do• he published /Ion 
for Hi•~d/I. This book explained in greater detai I the nature of 
the hu1an self and offered a 1ore co1plex analysis of the corrupting 
effects of society. Here Fro11 developed fully the I ink between 
1an's psychic needs and socioecono1ic structures in the for1ation of 
character. He also presented the hu1anist alternative, a philosophy 
of life attuned to basic needs of the self. 
Th~ Son~ Soci~ffl, finally, presented a socioecono1ic 
alternative to both bureaucratic capital is1 and bureaucratic 
co11unis1. Fro11 proposed a new order bui It upon the ideals of 
hu1anis1, a co11unity structured around the •Golden Rule.• The 
society he envisioned 1as sane because it catered to 1an's psychic 
needs and thus ended the distortion of hu1an nature by society. Man 
1ould be one 1ith hi1self and sane. Man would flourish in a 
condition of love, freedo1, and justice. The sane society 1ould 
constitute the fulfil l1ent of hu1anist ideals inspired by blbl ical 
prophecy. His hu1anis1 1as rooted In the religion of his youth, 
Judais1. 
17 
I ~' 
Life began for Erich Fro•• in Frankfurt am Main, Germany in 
1900. His parents were Orthodox Jews, and he was a precocious child 
who began to study the principle texts of Judaism, the Old Testa1ent 
and the Tal1ud, at an early age. The hopeful prophecies of Isaiah, 
Rios, and Hosea in the Old Testa1ent made a lasting impression on 
hia.3 In the after1ath of the First Uorld Uar he encountered Marx 
whose secularized 1essianis1 had a great influence as wel I, 
particularly in regard to his interpretations of history and 
religion. Marx, according to Bernard Tauber and Edward S. Landis, 
provided "the key to the understanding of history and the 
1anlfestatlon, in secular terms, of the radical humanism which was 
expressed in the messianic vision of the Old Testament prophets."4 
Fro11 studied briefly at the University of Frankfurt, and in 1919 
moved to the University of Heidelberg where he studied under Alfred 
Ueber, the sociologist and philosopher of history, Karl Jaspers, the 
existentialist, and Heinrich Rickert, the neo-Kantian philosopher. 
After receiving a doctorate in philosophy in 1922 for which he 
wrote a dissertation on "the sociopsychological structure of three 
Jewish Diaspora co11unities: the Karaites, the Hasidim, and the 
Refor•ed Je•s,• Fro•• 1oved to Munich 1here he studied psychiatry 
and psychology. He re1ained in Munich until 1930. There occurred 
two particularly significant 101ents in his intellectual 
3 Funk, Er h::h N'""'""' 1-9. Un I ess other• i se noted a I I 
biographical infor1ation for Fro11 comes from this source. 
iBernard Tauber and Edward S. Landis, "On Erich Fro11," In the 
Ho11111 1.1/ Li /111, Essogs in h1.mo1' 1.1/ Erh-:h N'''"" (New York: Ho It 1 
f 971) J x j I 
develop•ent. First, he ca•• in contact 1ith Buddhist philosophy 
1hich i•pressed hi• 1ith its co•bination of •ysticis• and 
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rational is•. Second, he read Johann Jakob Bachofen's 
sociopsychological study of patriarchal and •atriarchal societies 
/lc.ltJu,r Rig/It 1hich suggested to hi•, contra Freud, the pro•inence of 
social and cultural forces In the shaping of personality. 
In the 1930s Fro•• left Ger•any in order to escape Hazis•. He 
arrived In the United Sates In 1931. He 1as e1ployed as a professor 
of psychology at various universities and institutes around the 
country and established a 1orld1ide reputation as a •neo-Freudian• 
psychologist, utopian social critic, and hu1anist philosopher. In 
1919 he 1oved 1ith 1ife Annis to Mexico on the advice of her doctor. 
Thereafter, he divided his ti1e bet1een Mexico and the United States 
until his death In 1960. His professional I ife 1as devoted to 
developing a 1orkable synthesis of psychology, philosophy, and 
sociology. The product of this synthesis 1as a social psychology 
grounded in a hu1anist vie• of the 1orld. It 1as a 1ix of 
rational is1 and 1ysticis1 1ith strong doses of Marx and Freud. 
One of his biographers, Ranier Funk, has shed light on the 
crucial role of Judais1 as a source of Fro11's thought. The 
Influence of Judais1 is particularly interesting because Fro11 
abandoned the practice of conventional religion in his 1id-t1enties 
and thereafter espoused 1hat Funk has ter1ed •rel iglous hu1anis1.• 
According to Funk, Fro11's later thought reflected his early 
exposure to t10 traditions of Je1ish thought, rational is1 and 
1ysticis1. Tio thinkers, Moses Mal1onides and Her1ann Cohen, 
1 i:: 
'..I 
figured prominently in Fro11's encounter with Jewish rationalis1. 
Fro11 •as influenced greatly by the negative theology of twelfth-
century philosopher Mai1onides.S Taking the ban on images as 
absolute, Mai1onides denied the possibility of positive knowledge of 
God and 1aintained that descriptions of God 1ere really only 
descriptions of God's effects. Knowledge of God's effects 1as 
supposed to lead 1an to perfection. God's conduct was supposed to 
be the model for human conduct. As Maimonides wrote in his lu1id"' of 
tM h1"J'lt!'.n~d .• 
the chief ai1 of man should be to make himself, as far as 
possible, similar to God: that is to say, to make his acts 
similar to the acts of God, or as our Sages express it in 
explaining the verse, 'Ye shat I be holy': 'He is gracious, so 
you also be gracious; He is merciful, so be you also 
mere I fu I . ' 6 
In Mal1onldes, therefore, the Important questions of religion, of 
the Idea of God, thus become ethical questions In the Jewish 
tradition. 
Also Important to Fromm's understanding of Jewish rat Iona I Ism 
mas Hermann Cohen, who In the nineteenth century Infused Maimonides 
1 I th Kant. In books such as &~1.w tmd ilt:'IJ)t.f and Rt.fl igh:m ''' Rt!fi1:rt1n 
Cohen argued that the essence of rellglon was morality. For 
instance he 1rote In Rt!fi'l:tt.711 ond M'Pt.f, "Eth I cs 1ou Id be demeaned and 
religion obscured If God's significance were to be found beyond the 
5Funk, Erich Froaa, 183-94. 
61 bid., 186, citing Moses Mai ion ides, Gtlidt' 1.1! tht' Pt!lt"Plt11xed, 
trans., M. Friedlander (New York: Hebrew Puhl ishing Company, 
n Id I) J 198 I 
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real1 of 1orality. The ethics intrinsic to God 1 s nature, and that 
alone, constitutes religion In Judals1.•7 The ter1s religion and 
1orallty 1ere, In fact, Interchangeable, and religious kno1ledge, 
kno1ledge of God, 1as kno1ledge of God 1 s 1oral attributes. In the 
tradition of Kantian rationalls1 Cohen interpreted religion as a 
construct of reason. Cohen argued that the idea of God 1as 
essential for the existence of a 1oral order. Therefore, the 
existence of a 1oral order afflr1ed the existence of God. Cohen's 
conception of religion as a •rel iglon of reason• 1ent a step beyond 
Mai1onides 1 view of religion as •revelation understood by reason.•B 
Fro11 1ent one step further than Cohen and excised God fro1 
religion. Cohen I inked the existence of a 1oral order known only by 
reason to the existence of a •transcendent• God, an absolutely 1oral 
ideal. Fro• Fro11 1 s hu1anist perspective the logic of Cohen·s 
rationalist theology negated God. Rather than affir1 God, hu1an 
reason aff ir1ed the po1er of 1an. In a sense 1an beca1e God, and 
the question of relationship bet1een 1an and God dissolved into 
unity. 
The unity of God and 1an existed also as a the1e in the 
tradition of Je1ish 1ystlcls1. Thus the rationalist teachings of 
Mal1onldes and Cohen 1lngled in Fro11's 1lnd 1ith 1ysticis1. He 
encountered Je1ish 1ysticis1 1hile a student at the University of 
71bid., 169, citing Her1ann Cohen, R~asan and Nop~: 
Sdh!fct ions lro1 thd Je,ish Jlrit ings of Ne1,1ann Cah,..n, trans., Eva 
Jospe (He1 York: U.U. Horton & Co., 1971), 221. 
61bld., 188-91. 
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Heidelberg. Under the tutelage of the socialist Schneur Solian 
Baruch Rablnkov, Fro11 absorbed the teachings of Rabbi Shneur 
Zal1an, who in the eighteenth century established a refor1 1ove1ent 
within traditional Hasidls1 called Habad Hasidis1. Hasidis1 was 
essentially Kabballs1 1ith dee1phaslzed 1essianis1. Recording to 
Kabbalist teaching the achieve1ent of unity bet1een God and 1an 10s 
co1pleted by God. Recording to Hasidis1 it 10s not. Funk has 
1ritten that in Hasldis1 •the ethical and the religious spheres are 
brought into unity by ion's sanctification, 1hich is based on the 
idea that it is through 1an's action that creation is perfected.•9 
In Hasidis1, as in Kabbalis1, God and 1an 1ere united through the 
1ediation of the Zaddik, the •devout individual.• Habad Hasidis1, 
ho1ever, rejected the role of the Zaddik as the learned spiritual 
leader in favor of the benoi, the •average 1an.• The benoi, 
equipped 1ith reason, could achieve sanctification. Put si1ply, 
Habad Hasidis1 de1ocratized Judais1, and 1ade God's grace readily 
avai table to al I. 
Kabba I isa also taught that aan possessed t10 souls, a divine 
soul and an aniaal soul, Hasidis1 and Habad Hasidis1 retained this 
belief. In Hobod Hasidis1 it 10s believed that reason 10s 
sufficient for unraveling the aysteries of the divine soul through 
study of the Torah. The object of reason 1as to acquire kno1ledge 
that enabled aan to laltate God and thus share In God's divinity. 
The anlaal soul 1as associated 1ith evl I, and iaportantly, eui I 
91 b i d , I 1 98 • 
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represented in Jewish 1ysticis1, according to Funk, •a secondary 
pheno1enon.• In his essential nature 1an was good. The idea of 
evil as a secondary potentiality was a central feature of Fro11's 
thought. 
Funk has described Habad Hasidis1 as •1ystical psychology,•10 
that is the study of the divine soul by reason. Fro11's belief that 
the hu1an soul was subject to psychological inquiry see1s by 
i1plication to have had its source in the •1ystical psychology• of 
Habad Hasidis1. Despite the fact that Fro11 did not refer to Jewish 
1ysticis1 as a source of inspiration for his hu1anis1, Funk has 
de1onstrated an i1pressive nu1ber of parallels between Fro11's 
•religious hu1anis1• and Habad Hasidis1. In addition to the 
distinction between pri1ary and secondary natures and the idea that 
the hu1an soul was co1prehendible by psychology, Fro11's belief in 
hu1an self-perfection, as wel I as his natural is1, appear to have 
have had their origins in Habad Hasidis1. Fro11's hu1anis1J 
however, had a different center for its faith than did Habad 
Hasidis1. The latter revolved around a belief in God 1hile the 
for1er a belief in 1an. 11 
Fro11 substituted religious hu1anis1 for theistic bel lef. One 
1an replaced one God. Funk has explained that Fro11's concept of 
re I i g i ous hu1an i s1 1as drain f ro1 Marx. In his £1.":1.1noah:~ and 
Philo8ophico/ llonu8cript8 of 1611 Marx 1rote that •the question of 
101bid., 203, citing Gersho1 Schole1, /lo/or Trends in Je,ish 
llg8tici8a (He1 York: Schocken Books, 1954/1961), 341. 
lllbid., 204. 
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an alien being, a being above nature and 1an--a question •hich 
i1plies an ad1isslon of the unreality of nature and of 1an--has 
beco1e i1posslble in practice.•12 Fro11, follo•lng Marx, rejected 
theono1y outright as a contradiction of belief in hu1an autono1y. 
Unlike Marx, ho•ever, Fro11 did not see religious belief 1erely 
•itherlng a•ay as 1an escaped his socloecono1ic bondage. Contra 
Marx, Fro11 understood religious belief as ans1ering a hu1an need 
for an object of orientation and devotion. Consequently, Fro11 sa1 
hu1anis1 transcending theistic belief. Theistic belief existed 
historically as a co1pro1ise bet•een 1an's religious nature and 
irreligious society. Man, Fro11 1rote, •1ongs for a 1orld in 1hich 
love, freedo1, and justice are rooted, and since such a 1orld does 
not exist, he creates a separate institutions alongside society, 
rel igion.•13 In Fro11's rel lgioua hu1anis1 1an 1as to be his 01n 
object orientation and devotion. Society, In turn, 1ould beco1e the 
realization of 1an'a highest aspirations. Hu1anis1 overca1e the 
separation of the celestial city of God fro• the the terrestrial 
121bid., 215, citing Karl Marx, Eorlg J/riting~ (He1 York: 
Ulntage Books, 1975), 357. 
13Erich Fro11, postscript to Erich Froaa by Rainer Funk, 294-
95. Fro11 believed that his vie• of religion 1as essentially the 
sa1e as Marx's: •For hi1, religion 1as an opiate for 1an because it 
tries to satisfy his profoundest needs by illusions instead of 
allo1lng hi• to pluck the llvlng flo1er. Marx 1as not 
antireligious. He 1as profoundly religious and not an ene1y of 
'religion' for that very reason.• Fro11 believed that since Marx 
interpreted religion socioecono1lcally rather than psychologically, 
his hu1anis1 is 1isunderstood as antlrellglous (Erich Froaa, 213-
16). 
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city of aan, bet1een religious principle and earthly reality. nan, 
no longer torn bet1een God and Maaaon, 1ould becoae llke God. 
The rejection of theonoay and a belief in huaan self-perfection 
1ere the fountainheads of Froaa's psychology. Understanding aan as 
his 01n object of orientation and devotion 1as Its objective. He 
believed that psychology probed the depths of aan's nature. He 1as 
convinced that he could aho1 ho• aan had degenerated into a lo1er, 
brutish fora of life and ho1 aan could be reborn into a higher, 
divine fora. The purpose of E~ctlpi!I frt'W Fl'l!ftfdt'W 1as, Fro11 1rote, 
•to analyze those dyna1ic factors in the character structure of 
aodern aan 1hich aade hi1 1ant to give up freedo1 in Fascist 
countries and 1hich so 1idely prevail In 1111 ions of our own 
people.•li Fro11 1as concerned 1ith the dangerous i1pl ications of 
the character structure of 1odern 1an. For Fro11 psychology 1as 
bui It around the analysis of character. The question of 
understanding Fro11's psychology, therefore, beco1es one of 
understanding 1hat he aeant by character. 
In the 1ost si1ple ter1s character deter1ined ho• individuals 
got along in the 1orld. The function of character in the hu1an 
1orld 10s analogous to the function of instinct in other ani1als. 
Fro11 thought of character as •the hu1an substitute for the 
instinctive apparatus of the aniiat.•15 People 1ere not born 1ith 
liErich Fro11, £3cop~ fro• Fra6do• (He1 York: Rinehart & 
Co1pany, Inc., 1941), 6. 
15Erich Fro11, /Ion for Hi•36/f (He1 York: Rinehart & 
Co1pany, Inc., 1947), 59. 
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character. Instead, they acquired it as they 1atured. Character 
•as only one part of personality. Fro11 understood personality to 
be •the totality of inherited and acquired psychic qual I ties 1hich 
are characteristic of one Individual and 1hlch 1ake the Individual 
unique.•16 In essence Fro11 divided personality In t10. On one 
side 1ere those psychic qualities acquired socially 1hich co1prised 
character and on the other those inherited biologically. Character 
1as all l1portant to Fro11 because differences In character 
constituted •the real proble1s of ethics• 1hlle biological factors 
such as te1pera1ent held •no ethical significance.•17 
Uhether correct or not Fro11's distinction bet1een the 
ethically significant and insignificant portions of personality 1as 
crucial to his argu1ent. Since he intended to preserve the dignity 
of 1an, he needed to keep the focus on character and thus society as 
the root of evi I in the 1orld. ·rhe virtuous or the vicious 
character,• Fro11 1rote, •rather than single virtues or vices, is 
the true subject of ethical inquiry.•16 He believed that since 
character 1as acquired after birth through social interaction virtue 
and vice had who I ly social origins. He thought that by I inking 
ethics to character he was in a position to sho1 ho1 1an 1ay decide 
for hi1self 1hether he is living rightly or 1rongly. 
Fro11 1as convinced that a thorough understanding of character 
1ould enable 1an to ascertain the good life. To put Fro11's view of 
16fbid., 50. 
171bid., so. 
181 b j d ., 33 . 
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character in perapective it ia helpful to contrast hi• to Freud. 
Fro•• thought of hla theory of character as a •dyna•ic• alternative 
to Freud's •static• theory. Further1ore, he sa1 his theory as an 
elaboration of Freud's initial insight into the i1portance of 
character. According to Fro••, Freud had been the first to 
recognize the co1plex relationship bet1een behavior and character. 
Freud had aho1ed that 1hile behavior 1as a •anifestation of 
character, it did not •lrror character. In Fro••'s 1ords •Freud 
developed not only the f lrst but also the 1ost consistent and 
penetrating theory of character as a syste• of strivings 1hich 
underlie, but are not identical 1ith, behavior.•19 For Instance, 
courageous behavior could have been a consequence of a nu1ber of 
1otivations, a desire for fa•e or an urge to1ard suicide to na1e 
t10, but courage itself 1as not to be considered a character trait. 
Fro•• believed that Freud had erred 1hen he located the source of 
the strivings, 1hich go to •ake up character, in the libido. 
Fro•• 1ade a succinct exposition of the difference between Freud's 
•biologis1• and his 01n •social psychology.• 
Freud's essential principle is to look upon 1an as an entity, 
a closed syste1, endo1ed by nature 1ith certain 
physiologically conditioned drives, and to Interpret the 
develop1ent of his character as a reaction to satisfactions 
and frustrations of these drives; whereas, in our opinion, the 
funda1ental approach to hu1an personality is the understanding 
of 1an's relations to the 1orld, to others, to nature, and to 
hi•self. Ue believe that •an Is prl•arily a social being, and 
not, as Freud assu•es, prl•arlly self-sufficient and only 
secondarily in need of others to satisfy his instinctual 
19Fro11, hon ''"'', Ni•:j~/I, Si-58. 
needs. In this sense, •e believe that individual psychology 
Is funda1ental ly soc I al psychology, or in [Henry Stack] 
Sul I Ivan's ter1s the psychology of Interpersonal 
relationships; the key proble1 of psychology Is that the 
particular kind of relatedness of the lndlvldual to the 1orld, 
not the satisfaction of single Instinctual deslres.20 
. ..,, 
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Fro11 revised Freud's explanation for Irrational behavior and 
clai1ed that he had 1lstaken •the causal relation bet1een erogenous 
zones and character traits for the reverse of 1hat they really 
are.•21 Fro11 thought that erogenous zones 1ere useful 
1etaphorically, not diagnostically. Take for exa1ple the •oral• 
person. According to Fro11, he 1as a passive recipient of the 1orld 
around, possessed of •the desire to receive everything one 1ants to 
obtain--love, protection, kno1ledge, 1aterial things. , .. •22 This 
type of person 1ould often drea1 or fantasize about being fed, 
nursed, or other1ise orally sti1ulated. Freud concluded that such a 
person suffered fro1 an•oral fixation• and that his fixation had 
resulted fro1 excessive oral stl1ulatlon or deprivation during 
childhood. •oral fixation,• according to Fro11, 1as a particularly 
apt 1ay for the individual to express his •receptive orientation• to 
the 1orld. Llke1lse, •here Freud understood •anal• behavior traits 
such as obstinacy, orderliness, and aloofness to arise fro1 a 
childhood fixation on the anus, Fro11 sa1 such a •fixation• as an 
expression of an orientation to the 1orld he cal led •hoarding•. 
Fro11's difficulty 1ith Freud's position arose chiefly because Freud 
201bld., 290. 
21 Ibid.' 291. 
221bid., 291. 
did not satisfactorily explain social and cultural patterns of 
behavior. Fro•• criticized Freud's theory, by noting that 
as long as 1e assu•e, for instance, that the anal character, 
as It is typical of the European lo1er class, Is caused by 
certain early experiences in connection 1ith defecation, 1e 
have hardly any data that lead us to understand 1hy a specific 
class should have an anal social character.23 
It Is l•portant to point out that Freud's perspective lent 
itself to dark vle1s of hu•an nature and hu•an destiny. In 
24 
Civil h~ot h.m ond It~ Dl~1.~1.mttJnt~ { 1930) Freud argued that the 
de1ands of hu1an nature and society 1ere at odds. Apart fro• 
society 1an 1as a savage, 1ithin he 1as neurotic, lonely, and 
desperate. The building of a civl I lzatlon, according to Freud, 
proceeded upon the suppression of instlnct.21 Fro11 1 s vle1 of hu1an 
nature 1as irreconci I able 1ith Freud's, Uhen they looked inside 1an 
they sa1 funda1ental ly different beings. Freud sa1 a seething 
libido and Fro11 so1ethlng beautiful 1hich he ter1ed the self. 
Fro11 rejected Freud's theory of •instinctual orientation• because 
he could not accept its conclusion. Freud's vie1 led to a •profound 
conviction of the 1ickedness of hu1an nature.•25 The dlsagree1ent 
bet1een the t10 1en 1as over the nature of hu1ankind. 
Fro•• did not really reject Instinctual theory co1pletely. He 
identified one hu1an Instinct. Fro11 1 s 1an 1as born 1ith a 
benevolent Inclination to get along In the 1orld. For Freud 
231bid., 293. 
2"ts i g1und Freud, Ci vi I irot ion ond lt:J Di:Jconfdnf :t (He1 York: 
U. U. Horton, 1961), "t1. 
25F ro11, E:Jcopd lroa rraadoa, pg I 29"t . 
character 1as essentially a 1el I or Ill trained libido. For Fro11 
It 1as a nurtured or abused self. Fro11 1 s theory of character 
presupposed the good nature of 1an. Don Hausdorff has described 
Fro11's conception of the •self• as •the cornerstone of social 
character.• Hausdorff has noted that •1oglcally, the critics 1ho 
are unconvinced about Fro11's conception of the self believe, as a 
consequence, that his 1hole theoretical structure collapses.•26 
Fro11's harshest critic, John Scharr, charged, 
The concept of the self as a substance, a notion 1hich for 
centuries had been the strongest offspring of the 1etaphysical 
reason, 1as exposed by Huie as a bastard of confused and 
fevered l1aglnatlon. Since Hu1e's exposure, the self has 
never been restored to full philosophical legitiiacy.27 
''"IC 
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Scharr questioned the phi losophlcal legltl1acy of Fro11's hu1anis1, 
arguing that Fro11 1 s theory relied upon already discredited ideas in 
philosophy. Fro11 1 s for1ulation of the self, he 1rote, •rests upon 
a pre-Hu1ean conception of the self as a sl1ple substance and upon 
an Aristotel ion conception of potentiality as so1ething inherent in 
iatter.•26 Does Fro11 have a 1eaningful conception of the self? 
Fro11 1 s understanding of the self 1as 1ore spiritual than 
1etaphysical. For Fro11 the self represented hu1an nature. The 
self 1as an article of faith for hi1, and he 1as convinced of its 
nobility. He deferred to the authority of Aristotle and of Spinoza 
26oon Hausdorff, Eri1.~/J Fro•• (He1 York: T1ayne 
Publishers,1972), i7. 
27 John Scharr, £~capt!' fro• Rut/Jority, 66. 
261bid., 68. 
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in the for1ulation of •hat he called a hu1anistic science of ian.29 
Fro11 revived so1ething akin to Aristotle's Idea of final-cause. 
Aristotle had •ritten, •Hature, llke 1lnd, al•ays does •hatever it 
does for the sake of so1ething, •hich so1ething is its end.•30 
Hature pursued an end, its end being its final cause. Fro11 shared 
•ith Aristotle a teleological vie• of hu1an nature and •rote, •Fro1 
the nature of 1an, Aristotle, deduces the nor• that 'virtue' 
{excellence) Is 'activity,• by •hich he 1eans the exercise of the 
functions and capacities peculiar to ian.•31 Spinoza had defined 
virtue as •preserving one's being• and preserving one's being as 
beco1ing •hat one potentially is. Fro11 concluded that •virtue is 
the unfolding of the specific potentialities of every organis1; for 
1an it is the state in •hich he is 1ost huian.•32 Man •ould be 1ost 
hu1an •hen he had fulfilled hi1self or as Funk •rote, perfected 
creation. Fro11 believed that the 1odern •ay of life •as a 
perversion of creation and that 1ental illness •as the consequence. 
He sa• 1odern 1an's destructive and confor1ist character as evidence 
of his sickness. His judg1ent of the hu1an condition depended on 
29Fro11, !Ion for Ni1~t1/f, 25-30. Bertrand Russell reported 
that Mai1onides is regarded as an l1portant source for Spinoza. 
Thia supports circuaetantial ly Funk's argu1ent that Maiaonides 
influenced Fro11 since he ackno•ledges his indebtedness to Spinoza. 
R Ni:rtor11 of Jltfsfttrn P/Jilo:rop/J11 (He1 York: Si1on and Schuester, 
19i6), i23. 
30 Enc11clopt1dio of p/Jilo:rop/J11_, 1972 ed., s. v. •psycho I ogy• by 
R.S. Peters and C.A. Mates, 3. 
31 Fro11, !Ion for Ni1:rt1/ f, 25. 
32tbld., 26. 
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his ability to determine what man actually was and what his needs 
1ere. 
Huie had contended that perceptions were distinct and 
ephe1eral and that It 1as not possible to establish connections 
a1ong the1, and, therefore, that the idea of a human self as a unity 
was fallacious.33 He described the self as nothing other than a 
•bundle of perceptions.• Fro11 was suggesting on the other hand 
that belief in the human self was not unfounded. The progress of 
psychology lay, he wrote, 
in the return to the great tradition of humanistic ethics 
which looked at man in his physico-spiritual totality, 
believing that man's aim is to be himself and that the 
condition for attaining this goal is that man be for 
himself.34 
Fro11 believed that the study of unconscious motivation, which Freud 
had revolutionized, had established the groundwork for a 
philosophical revolution. ·rhe drive to I Ive is inherent in every 
organis1,• he wrote, "and man cannot help wanting to live regardless 
of 1hat he would like to think about it•35 Psychology revealed the 
nature of this Inherent drive for I lfe and thus was able to make 
distinctions bet1een normal and abnor1al psychological develop1ent. 
Uhat 1as conducive to nor1al development 1as good and what was 
conducive to abnor1al development 1as bad. He did not express a 
factual understanding of the self, and he was guilty of suggesting 
33 The Encuch.1pedit1 1.1f Phi h.u1ophy, 1972 ed., s. u. "Psycho I ogy" 
by A.S. Peters and C.A. Mace, 13-14. 
34Fro11, I/on fol' Hi ass/ f, 7. 
35 I b i d • , 16 • 
28 
that he had evidence when he had none. Thus he left hi•self open to 
critlcis•s such as those •ade by Scharr. Fro•• would have been 
better off if he had avoided the issue of a 1etaphyslcal self, but 
his failure on this count 1as not fatal. Faith is secure 1ithout 
1etaphysics, and the whole of Fro11's thought rested upon the 
presupposition that evil acts were abnor1al and contrary to hu1an 
nature. 
Fro11 drew his conception of hu1an nature, of the hu1an self, 
fro1 his esti1ation of 1an's existential condition. Fro11 clai1ed 
to understand 1an's existential needs. In hon for Ni•:t~lf he 
introduced the idea of existential needs, and in Th~ Son~ So&i~tyhe 
developed idea fully. Five existential needs predo1inated. There 
1ere needs for relatedness, transcendence, rootedness, an experience 
of unity, and an object of devotion,36 Existential needs 1ere 
consequences of 1hat Fro11 ter1ed •existential dichoto1ies,• and 1an 
experienced the• because of 1ho he 1as. Fro11 cal led 1an •the freak 
of the universe.• •self-a1areness, reason, and i1aginatlon,• he 
suggested, •have disrupted the 'har1ony' 1hich characterizes ani1al 
existence. Their e1ergence had 1ade aan into an ano1aly, into the 
freak of the universe.•37 The siaple fact that 1an 1as aware of his 
01n existence invited proble1s not experienced by other ani1als. He 
argued that aan 1as confounded by t10 existential contradictions. 
First, consciousness haunted 1an. Since 1an 1as a1are of hiaself, 
he 1as also a1are of his 1ortality. The fact that throughout life 
36Fro11, TM .. ~ St:1t~i~ty, chapter 3. 
37Fro11, /hn f,.,,, Ni•:t~I I, 40. 
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1an could anticipate death, Fro11 believed, forced 1an into 
accepting defeat for hl•self. The second existential dlchoto•y •as 
dependent on the first. Because death •as i11lnent, 1an realized 
that he could not acco1plish •hat his birth set hi1 forth to do. 
•nan's life,• he 1rote, •beginning and ending at one accidental 
point in the evolutionary process of the race, conflicts tragically 
•Ith the individuals clai1 for the realization of all of his 
potential itiea.•38 Fro11 •as arguing that the facts of existence 
engender fatal ls1. A person could not hope to acco1pl ish al I that 
he 1as capable of achieving. To do so hie lifespan 1ould have had 
to equal that of hu1anlty. 
To dra1 the 1eaning of existential dichoto1ies 1ore clearly, 
Fro11 juxtaposed the1 to historical dlchoto1ies. Historical 
dichoto1ies referred to the proble1s of history that 1ere 1an-1ade. 
He considered instances of 1an's lnhu1anlty to 1an in ter1s of 
historical dichoto1ies. Historical dichoto1ies posed special 
proble1s for 1an, but they 1ere solvable uni ike existential 
dichoto1ies. Because they 1ere often confused 1ith existential 
dichoto1ies, Fro11 felt that proble1s 1ith solutions 1ent 
unresolved. The seeds of cruelty 1ere not planted in hu1an nature. 
Rather, as he •rote In E~c~p~ froa Frdddoa, •the 1ost beautiful as 
1ell as the 1ost ugly inclinations of 1an"'2re not part of a fixed 
3Blbid., .. 2. 
and biologically given hu1an nature, but result fro1 the social 
process •hich creates ian.•39 
Fro11's 1essage 1as that 1an could not be Indifferent to his 
01n fate. He 1as convinced of the oneness of 1an. •one 
lndlvldua1,• he declared, 
represents the hu1an race. He Is one specific exa1ple of the 
hu1an species. He Is •he• and he Is •a11•; he Is an 
individual 11th his pecul larities and In this sense unique, 
and at the sa1e tl1e he Is representative of the al I 
characteristics of the hu1an race. His individual personality 
is deter1ined by the peculiarities of hu1an existence co11on 
to al I ien.10 
30 
Fro11 devised a 1oral philosophy pre1ised on his belief In the unity 
of 1an. Egois1 and solipsis1 1ere l1possible. •Love of others and 
love of ourselves, he 1rote, •are not alternatlves.•11 Thus, 
follo1ing Aristotle and Spinoza, he offered 1hat he ter1ed as an 
•objectlvlst• approach to the proble1 of self-Interest. He equated 
•seeking one's profit• 1ith •virtue" and turned the proble1 of 
ethics into one of ascertaining 1hat self-interest really 1as. •it 
follo1s,• he contended, 
39Fro11, E8cop6 fro1 rr66do1, 12. At this stage In his 1ork 
Fro11 had not developed the Idea of exlstentlal needs. He believed 
that 1an had only physiological and historical needs. Because he 
1as not thinking in ter1s of 1oral philosophy, existential needs 
1ere not essential to his argu1ent. Uhen he beca1e concerned 1ith 
hu1anist philosophy he encountered a proble1 of objectivity. He 
solved this proble1 by postulating hu1an nature as his source of 
objectivity. The Idea of 1an's existential self and its needs thus 
beca1e cruel al. 
iOFro11, /Ion for Hl1~dll, 11. 
illbld.,129. 
that 1an can deceive hi1self about his real self-Interest if 
he is ignorant of his self and Its real needs and that the 
science of 1an Is the basis for deter1lnlng what constitutes 
1an's self-lnterest.12 
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The •real needs• of the self 1ere those 1hich produced 
har1ony. Man 1as to •seek his 01n profit,• his profit being 
synony1ous 1ith the prof it of others. Kant's co11and to •act so as 
to treat hu1anity, 1hether in your 01n person or In that of another, 
al1ays as an end and never as a 1eans only• puts In a phrase 1hat 
Fro11 1eans by •seeking one's 01n profit.• Kant 1ould have objected 
to the idea of basing an ethical syste1 on the principle of •seeking 
one's 01n profit,• but Fro11 echoed Kant's opinion that Individuals 
be vie1ed al1ays as subjects not objects, as ends not 1eans.i3 
Fro11 believed that the Insights of psychology val !dated his 
opinion of self-interest, and he produced a corollary to the •Golden 
Rule•: ·uhatever you do to others, you also do to yourself•. 
•ro violate the forces directed to1ard I ife in any hu1an being,• he 
explained, •necessarily has repercussions on ourselves.·1i This 
article of faith derived directly out of a belief in the hu1an self, 
a belief in the goodness of the hu1an soul steeped in the Je1ish 
tradition. 
Fro11 based his theory of character upon his understanding of 
hu1an nature. Character 1as a function of the self. Through his 
12fbid.,13i. His discussion of •selfishness, Self-Love, and 
Self-Interest• runs fro1 119- 111. 
13Jbid.,121-21,1i3. 
111bld., .225 
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involveaent in the social process aan tried to satisfy the needs of 
the self and acquired his character. In llc1n for Hl•~~lfFro•• 
explained character as arising because of the self's need for 
relatedness. He aentioned the other four needs for transcendence, 
rootedness, unity, and devotion but in a context that suggested he 
considered the1 to be subsu1ed in a general need for relatedness.is 
•The funda1ental basis of character,• he argued, Is seen in ho1 •1an 
related hi1self to the 1orld.• A person's character described ho1 
he 1as related to the 1orld, and Fro11 described this as a 
•character orientation." A single character orientation involved 
t10 processes of relating to the 1orld. A process of assiai lat ion 
deter1ined an individual's relationship to the 1aterlal 1orld, and a 
process of socialization his relationship to other people and 1ith 
hi1self. Fro11 out I ined five character orientations. In turn, he 
out I ined five processes of assi1i lat ion and five processes of 
socialization. Thus he defined each character orientation by its 
processes of assi1i lat ion and socialization. He further 
distinguished each of the five character orientations as being 
either nonproductive or productive. There 1ere four nonproductive 
orientations and one productive orientation. Honproductive and 
productive 1ere synony1ous 1ith unhealthy and healthy. 
Honproductive orientations 1ere unhealthy because they 1ere 
perversions of hu1an nature. In all because there 1ere four 
nonproductive character orientations, there 1ere four nonproductive 
iSlbid., 13-7. 
,..., 
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processes of assi1ilation and four nonproductive processes of 
socialization. In addition because there was one productive 
character orientation, there was one productive process of 
assi1ilation and one productive process of socialization. I wil I 
begin with the four nonproductive character orientations, discussing 
first their processes of assi1ilation and then their processes of 
socialization. This wi I I prepare the way for understanding the 
productive orientation. 
Fro11's sche1e began 1ith a detailed analysis of the ele1ents 
co1prising the four nonproductive orientations. The four 
nonproductive processes of assi1I lat Ion 1ere the receptive, 
exploitative, hoarding, and 1arketing. A receptive person felt that 
the source of all good was outside of hi1self. He looked to others 
for nurture. Kno1ledge 1as so1ething others gave hi1, as 1as love. 
Decisions were things others 1ade for hi1. He was typically 
•opti1istlc and friendly,• and he had •a certain confidence In life 
and Its gifts.• He functioned 1el I unti I his •source of supply is 
threatened.•i6 
The exploitative person 1as llke the receptive in one 
respect. He sa1 the outside 1orld as the source of al I good. 
He did not however expect to be sho1ered 11th gifts. His 1otto 
1as •stolen fruits are a1eeteat.• He appropriated the thoughts, 
love, and 1ares of other.i7 
i61bid., 62-3. 
i71bid., 61-65· 
-------i 
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The hoarding person unlike the receptive and the exploitative 
sa• the outside •orld not as the source of good but aa •here bad 
things lurk. They 1ere 1iserly and possessive of love. He valued 
order and security. His bel leued that •there is nothing ne• under 
the sun,• and •1ine is 1ine and yours is yours.•iB 
In historical ter1s the receptive orientation 1as 1oat 
prevalent in pre-capitalist, highly-structured, traditional 
cultures In •hich deference to authority •as highly valued. In 
1odern cultures it revealed itself in peoples' attitudes to1ards 
•experts• and •public opinion•. People respected the person •ho 
could tel I the1 •hat to eat, •hat to •ear, and ho• to be happier. 
The exploitative and hoarding orientations referred to the proto-
typical capitalists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
They existed •side by side,• the for1er as the ruthless free-
1arketer and the latter as his 1ore conservative puritan 
counterpart.i9 
The la8t, and 1oat 1odern, nonproductiue orientation •as 
the 1arketing character. He 1a9 a protege of Dale Carnegie and 
had learned ho1 to 1ln friends and Influence people. He 1as a 
product of the 1odern abstract and i1personal 1arketplace. His 
orientation 1as •rooted in the experience of hi1self a8 a 
co11odlty and of his value as an exchange ualue.• He 1as an 
Individual 11th a plastic Identity and his 1otto 1a8 •1 01 as you 
desire 1e.• For hi1 equality 1eant sa1eneaa, and peculiar and 
i81bid., 66-67. 
i9tbid., 79-81. 
queer carried •holly negative connotations. His human 
relationships were superficial and his love, casual. 
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The four nonproductive processes of socialization 1ere sadis1, 
1asochis1, destructiveness, and indifference or auto1aton confor1ity 
as F ro11 ca 11 ed i t i n E..'if~flPtf' li"t.v fi'tllfldt.v. 50 He cons i dered t he1 to 
be •1echanis1s of escape," and he distinguished the1 as either types 
of sy1biotlc relatedness or types of •ithdra•l-destructiveness.51 
Sadis1 and 1asochis1 were sy1biotic, and destructiveness and 
indifference •ere 1ithdra1l-destructive. The psychological meaning 
of sy1biosis 1as •the union of one individual self with another." 
"Both the 1asochistic and the sadistic strivings," Fro1m wrote, 
"tend to help the individual escape his unbearable feeling of 
aloneness and poierlessness.•52 Though they had the same source, a 
fear of freedo1, 1asochis1 and sadis1 were considered opposite 
expressions of the sa1e striving. The masochist's perversion was 
the •conscious and intentional enjoy1ent of pain or hu1i liation.•53 
His need to sub1it 1ade hi1 willing to suffer almost any abase1ent. 
The 1asochist •as dependent on his tormentor, but Fro11 argued that 
S01n Escopt1 Ira• Frt1t1da• Fro11 discussed a •1echanis1 of 
escape,• authorltarianis1, which enco1passed sadis1 and 1asochis1, 
destruct iueness, and auto1aton confor1ity. In /Ion for Hi•sttlf he 
changed the na1e of "auto1aton confor1ity" to "indifference.• In 
addition, he elaborated upon these and discussed four nonproductive 
processes of socialization. The analysis in the t10 books 1as 
essentially the same; ho1ever, In the former he went Into greater 
detail, his motivation being Hitler and Hazl Germany. 
51Fro11, /Ion /1..,r H/ast!I/~ 107. 
52F ro11, Es1.-:t1pt.f li10• Fl1t!ll!fda•, 151 . 
531 b Id • I 146 • 
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the tor•entor, the aadiat •aa also dependent on hia victi•.51 A 
sense of his o•n isolation and po•erlessnesa co•pelled the sadist to 
seek a sense belongingness and l1portance through do1ination. 
Sadia• and •aaochla• •ere alternative •anifeatationa of the aa1e 
•sy•biotlc co1plex,• and Fro•• preferred to speak of the aado-
1asochistic orientation.SS 
In E~capd fro• Fraddl.'• Fro11 used his analysis of the sado-
1asochlst ic orientation to explain the rise of Hazis1 In Ger1any 
during the 1930s. Hazis1, he clai1ed, appealed to psychic needs 
of those dissatisfied •ith their declining fortunes in the poet 
Uorld Uar I era. He explained Hitler's appeal to the Ger1an lo•er 
1iddle class, the pet it bourgeois, on the grounds that Its status 
1as 1ost threatened by econo1ic upheaval ,56 
Destructiveness and indifference led to •ithdra•al rather than 
sy1biosis. Sadis1 1as destructive, but the goal of sadis1 •as the 
incorporation of the object. The destructive orientation, ho•ever, 
ai1ed at its el i1ination. Fro11 explained, •sadis1 tends to 
strengthen the ato1ized individual by the do1ination over othersj 
destructiveness by the absence of any threat fro1 the outside.•57 
The destructive person •ants to be left alone by the •orld. Uhen 
the 1orld, intruded he lashed out. The auto1aton or indifferent 1as 
plastic. He gave up his individual self and beca1e an auto1aton, 
51 t b I d . , 115 . 
551bld., 156-59. 
S61bid., 216-17. 
571 b i d . , 179 . 
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•identical 1ith iii lions of others,• and had no need to •feel alone 
and anxious any•ore.•56 
The processes of assi1llatlon and socializatlon 1ere 
associated. People tended to respond to things and people in 
al1llar 1ays. The 1arketlng orientation 1as co1patlble 11th 
auto1aton confor1lty, the receptive orientation 11th 1asochls1, the 
exploitative orientation 11th aadls1, and the hoarding orientation 
1ith deetructiveness.59 In Fro11'e eyes 1odern 1an 1ae beco1ing an 
auto1aton, and his character 1as being conditioned in the 
1arketplacee of goods and services(people) and of ideas. Fro11 
described 1odern 1an In ter1e of hie •pseudo character, •peeudo-
acts, •and lastly, •peeudo-self.•60 Since 1an, according to Fro11 1 
•acquires that character 1hich 1akes hi1 1ant to do 1hat he has to 
do : the pseudo condition of 1odern 1an's existence presupposed 
that 1odern society 1ae a pseudo society. The fate of the sane 
society and the fate of the productive orientation 1ere inextricably 
I inked. Until there 1ae a sane society, Fro11 did not bel leve that 
there can be truly sane people. The I iving by definition 1ere 
insane. 
The indict1ent of the 1ental health of lndlvlduale 1ae an 
lndict1ent of the 1ental health of society and vice versa. In Thl!I 
Sonl!I Socil!ll!f he declared that •The cure of social pathology 1ust 
follo1 the sa1e principles [as the cure for individual pathology], 
S61bid., 166. 
59F ro11, /Ion 11.111 Hi•~l!l If, see d i agra1 on 111 . 
60Fro11, E:tcopl!I fro• Frl!ledo•, 185-206. 
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aince it ia the pathology of ao aany huaan beings, and not of an 
entity beyond or apart fro• individuals.•61 Thus the cure of 
individual pathology and disappearance of nonproductive characters 
1aited on a social aetaaorphosis. The productive orientation 1as a 
coaplete contrast to the four nonproductive ones. Its process of 
assial lat ion 1as •1orklng,• and its process of socialization 1as 
•1ovlng and reaaoning.•62 The productive person did not see the 
outside 1orld as either the source of all good or al I bad. He 
related to the 1orld and to people on the basis true self-interest 
and true self-love. Self-interest and self-love entailed the sa1e 
thing for al I Individuals because they arose out of 1an's 
existential condition. Fro11 1rote, 
Hu1an existence Is characterized by the fact that 1an Is alone 
and separated fro• the 1orld; not being able to stand the 
separation, he Is l1pelled to seek for relatedness and 
oneness. There are 1any 1ays In 1hlch he can real lze this 
need, but only one in 1hich he, as a unique entity, re1ains 
intact; only one in 1hich his po1ers unfold In the process of 
being related ... ,63 
Froa1's vision of a 1orld of love and reason, of har1ony, of 
the brotherhood of aan, Is one 1hose beauty fe1 1ould dispute. He 
offered so1e guide I Ines in Tllt1 .. ~ntf Soc ltft !I for going about the 
restructuring of huaan existence.61 Basically, he cal led upon aan 
61Fro11, TM. .. ~ .. ~7t.~l~ty, 273. 
62Froaa, /Ian f,.,,, Hl•~el f, 110-11 . 
631bid., 96-7. 
6~tbld., Chapter 8. 
to put into practice the principles 1ost people already paid •1ip 
service• to-- fairness, equal lty, and respect. 
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Faith •as the key to understanding Fro11's utopianls1. He 
described faith as a character trait. The •ord for faith In the Old 
Testa1ent •as •E1unah,• and Fro11 translated it as •fir1ness.•6S 
Faith •as a confident attitude to Fro11. In the Je1ish tradition 
faith •as expressed by a confident attitude in 1an's relation to 
God. For the 1odern age •hen belief in God 1as no longer 
sustainable, Fro11 felt that faith In 1ankind 1as indispensable. He 
argued that his religious hu1anis1 1as the logical successor to the 
Judeo-Christian belief in God. •There is 1uch less difference,• he 
1rote, 
bet1een a 1ystic faith In God and an atheist's rational faith 
in 1ankind than bet1een the for1er's faith and that of a 
Calvinist 1hose faith In God is rooted In the conviction of 
his 01n po1erlessness and in his fear of God's po1er.66 
The heart of the 1atter 1as Fro11's faith in the regenerative 
capacity of 1an. Fro11's argu1ent 1ith his critics such as Scharr, 
1ho favored the orthodox position of Freud,67 1as in the tradition 
of the centuries old debate over the nature of 1an and sin. 
Centuries before, Pelagius and Augustine had argued over the nature 
of Ada1's sin and Its 1eaning for hu1anlty. Augustine 1as judged 
the 1inner and Pelaglus a heretic for his rejection of the idea of 
original sin. Fro11 sided 1ith Pelagius. ·rhe battle 1as ion by 
65tbid., 199. 
66 I b i d ., 21 0 . 
67scharr, E:1copd froa Ruthorif!J, 19. 
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Augustine," he wrote, "and this victory was to determine--and to 
darken--aan's aind for centuries."68 In the end--despite his 
popularity--Fro11 1 s vie• was not representative of the intellectual 
cli1ate of the 19i0s and 50s. He could contrast himself to Reinhold 
Niebuhr 1hose brand of "neo-orthodox" Christianity gained prominence 
in this period.69 On the one hand, Niebuhr was less pessimistic 
about the present and on the other hand, less optimistic about 
future. Man, for Hiebuhr, had a paradoxical nature, possessing both 
a capacity for evil and a capacity for good. He did not see evi I, 
as Fro11 did, as a secondary potentiality. Niebuhr warned against 
humanistic conceptions of man and argued that the "root of sin" was 
man's overestimation of himself, hubris. "Sin, 0 he wrote in Foith 
ond Historg, "is, in short, the consequence of man's inclination to 
usurp the prerogative of God [and] to think more highly of himself 
that he ought to •.. ,•70 He reproved utoplans lacking of caution 
and exulting the po1ers of 1an, and he viewed utopian thought as a 
recipe for tragedy. In the aftermath of Uorld Uar I I the mood was 
cautious, and Hiebuhr was a principal evoker of it. Fromm's 
opti1is1 about hu1an nature and confidence in the future stood out 
as a 1ore hopeful prophecy. But it stood out in another respect, as 
wel I. 
66Fro11, hon fo1' hiast!fl f, 211 . 
691bid., 212, note 67. Also see Richard Uright1an Fox, 
Reinhold Hishuhl' (Hew York: Pantheon Books, 1985). Fox believes 
that Hiebuhr was "much closer in spirit" to Freud's Cifdlirt1fh.7n tmd 
Its Discontents than to Fromm's I/on fol' Hiast!f/ f, 256. 
70Re i nho Id Hi ebuhr, f'tu'th ond Hist''"!! (Hew York: Seri bner' s, 
f 9i9) J 121. 
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There 1as a dourness to Fro11's thought. At the outset 
e1phasized the tension bet1een opti1is1 and pessi1is1 present in 
Fro11 1 s 1ork. There 1as a vivid contrast bet1een lightness and 
darkness in his thinking. On the one hand it see1s as though his 
1lnd 1as burled In the present, and on the other as though it 1as in 
full flight to future. The present, refracted through visions of 
death every1here, 1as apparently beyond rede1ptlon. •in the 
nineteenth century,• Fro11 1rote, •the proble1 1as that God is dead; 
in the t1entieth century the proble1 is that 1an is dead.•71 The 
t1in perils 1ere •1ar and robotis1.• Yet by an act of hu1an 1i I I 
the present 1ould give 1ay to the future. 
The 1oral proble1 of the t1entieth century, Fro11 1rote, •is 
1an 1 s indifference to hiiself.•72 The choice to do good 1as 1an's, 
and he continued: 
Heither the good nor the evi I outco1e is auto1atic or 
preordained. The decision rests 1ith 1an. It rests upon his 
abi I ity to take hl1self, his life and happiness seriously; on 
his 1i I I lngness to face society's 1oral proble1. It rests 
upon his courage to be hi1self and to be for hliself .73 
It Is not clear, ho1ever, that 1an can choose to do good. Perhaps, 
only Individuals can. I 1onder 1hether the 1oral position of each 
individual Is I inked, as suggested by Fro11, 1ith that of al I other 
1en? Uhat If the 1oral failures of society 1ere only reflections of 
the 1oral fal lures of Individuals? Did he not kno1 any sane or 
71 Fro11, !ht' Soni!' Socidf!f, 360. 
721bid., 2i8. 
731bid., 250. 
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aoral aen. Uhat, for that aatter, about Erich Froaa? Certainly, he 
•as not indifferent to the fate of •an. Fro•• used the study of 
character to find aan, all aen, innocent. He shifted the bla1e for 
•ar and genocide fro• Hitler and his henchaen to the social 
pressures that aolded their characters. Fro•• 1ust have hated a 
1orld that could generate such evil, yet he loved aan and aade plans 
for his future and toaorro1's better 1orld. 
In chapter t10 1e turn to the 1ork of David Ries1an. 
1ork the concept of social character becaae less fatalistic. 
used the study of character to address a different proble1. 
In his 
He 
Uhereas 
Fro•• focused on the proble1 of evi I, Ries1an 1as concerned 1ith 
individual is1. He celebrated the autono1ous individual 1ho 
transcended his socially prescribed character. His concern for 
individualis1 1as not unrelated to events that influenced the tenor 
of Fro11's 1ork. The rise of totalitarianis1 brought to the fore 
aaong Aaerican intellectuals 1orries about the forces of 
centralization and bureaucratization in A1erican I ife. John Scharr 
has re1arked that David Rles1an took •the 1iddle fro• Fro11" but 
•refused both Fro11's pre1ises about the hu1an condition and his 
1hole critical position.•7i Here Scharr nicely captures the general 
relationship bet1een Riesaan's thought and Fro11's. Froa1's 
psychology provided Ries1an 11th a 1ay of explaining the A1erican 
character. Riesaan ad1lred Froa1, but try as he 1ight he 1as 
7ischarr, E8copt' lt'o• Ruthorltg, 75. 
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CHAPTER 111 
DRUID RIESMRH 
During the 19i0s and 50s the dangers of pol ltlcal and econo1lc 
agglo1eratlon In the United States see1ed unparalleled. A host of 
books detal I Ing the pl lght of 1odern bureaucratic 1an appeared. 
Urlters such as UI llla1 H. Uhyte, C. Urlght Miiis, Dwight Macdonald, 
Paul Good1an, and David Rles1an focused their attention on the 
proble1s of the individual In 1ass society. Rles1an's work stands 
out for Its theoretlcal analysls of character and hlstorlcal 
perspective. 
Rles1an approached the proble1 of lndivldual is• fro1 a 
sociological point of vle1. The central question of sociology Is 
ho1 the actions of people In a society are coordinated. Ries1an 
adapted the study of character and addressed this question. 
Character, as It was defined by Fro11, functioned as a coordinating 
1echanls1. The Individual, he wrote, •acquires that character 1hlch 
1akes hl1 1ant to do 1hat he has to do.•1 Thus, according to 
Fro11's theory of character, social coordination 1as achieved 
through the psychologlcal Indoctrination of lndlvlduals. By their 
very natures sociological analysis and the study of character raised 
1Erich Fro11, !Ion for Hi•~~// (He1 York: Rinehart & Co1pany 
Inc. , 19i 1 ), 60. 
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questions about indiuidualie•, in particular about its validity as a 
concept? The key question for Ries•an, In this respect, 1as if 
Individuals acquire the character that 1akes the1 1ant to do 1hat 
they have to do, ho1 can people be said to express the•selves as 
individuals? 
Ries1an's concept of autono1y addressed the proble• of 
lndlvidualis• fro• 1ithln the study of character. Rutono•y 1as one 
of three •1odes of adaption.• Modes of adaption expressed in ter•s 
of character ho1 a person reacted to the socialization process. For 
Ries1an a person could be ano1ic, adjusted, or autono•ous. Ries1an 
believed that the 1ajority 1ere either ano1ic (1aladjusted) or 
adjusted (nor1al). Most 1ere adjusted. A 1inority 1as autono1ous, 
and they •ere heroic to Ries•an. Despite the fact that Ries•an's 
discussion of autono1y ca1e to1ards the end of Th~ Lon~l!J Cro•d, it 
1as the key to understanding his theory of character. The concept 
of autono•y, in a senee though, stood above hie analyeie of 
character because the person 1ho 1as autono1ous represented an 
exception. He 1as unique and did not share 11th others the 
character of his ti1e. To fully appreciate the i1portance of 
autono1y in Ries1an's thought, it is first necessary to understand 
its place in his theory of character. Therefore, I iii I discuss 
autono1y no1 only in general ter1e and return to It later 1hen I 
have laid out enough of his theory of character. 
The autono1ous defied characterological analysis. Ries1an 
considered the achleve1ent of autono1y to be an a1akening to the 
real lty of social confor1lty. The autono1ous person 1as so1eone 
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•hose •acceptance of social and political authority •as al•ays 
conditional,• so1eone •ho could •cooperate •Ith others in action 
•hlle 1aintaining the right to private judgeient.•2 He 1as so1eone 
•ho coordinated his o•n actions rather than had his actions 
coordinated for hi1. Thus for Ries1an the study of character beca1e 
one of assessing social pressures to•ard confor1ity. This suggests, 
of course, that he saw knowledge of the1 as their re1edy, that he 
saw understanding of social character as first step to•ard autono1y. 
Ries1an 1 s historical study of character, Tl>t!I Lt7Ml!J t.l't7tld, can be 
understood in light of his individual is1. The object of his study 
•as to gain a better understanding of the 1odern setting by placing 
it in its historical perspective, that is to gauge the chances for 
autono1y in 1odern R1erica against those in previous periods. 
Ries1an 1 s e1phasis upon individualis1 signaled the 
A1ericanization of Fro11 1 s study of character. Fro11 1 s focus 1as on 
the relationship between 1an and society. Ries1an, ho•ever, zeroed 
in on the relationship bet•een the individual and society. His 
concern for individual is1 placed hi1 •ithin a honored tradition in 
A1erican letters. •The quest for the autono1ous individual,• Joseph 
Gusf ield has •ritten, •absorbed A1erican social co11ent fro1 E1erson 
to R i es1an. •3 Thl!f Lt.7ntfl!J Cro•d throughout re1 i nds one of E1erson 's 
2oav Id R i es1an, Tht1 L ont1 I !I Cro•d, abr I dged ed It ion 1 it h a 1969 
preface (He1 Haven: Yale University Press, 1950; Yale University 
Press, 1953), 251. 
3Joseph Gusfleld, •rhe Soclologlcal Real lty of A1erlca,• On 
l/oJing ll•lfricon8, £;1:u111tt in honor of Dovid Rit1tt•on ed., Herbert 
Gans, Hothan Glazer, Joseph Guaf ield, and Christopher Jencks 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), 52-3. 
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dlctu1 In •self-Reliance:• •tt is easy in the 1orld to I Ive after 
the 1orld's opinion; it is easy in solitude to I ive after our 01n; 
but the great 1an is he 1ho, in the 1idst of a cro1d, keeps 1ith 
perfect s1eetness the Independence of solitude.•1 Like E1erson 
Ries1an 1orried about the degree to 1hich society li1ited individual 
i1agination, thought, and action. Thus he 1as led to consider ho1 
individuals could free the1selves of their socially prescribed 
character. He 1aa 1uch leas prone than Fro11 to confuse the destiny 
of a single individual 1ith the fate of hu1anity. Riea1an held out 
hope for an autono1ous 1inority in an other1ise •insane society.• 
Though he patterned his autono1ous character on Fro11's •productive 
orientation,• he found it •hard to i1agine an autono1oua society 
co1ing into being no1, even on a s1al I scale, or perhaps especially 
on a s1al I scale.•5 He considered the autono1ous fe1 to be the 
•saving re1nant• of hu1anity. By their refusal to succu1b to 
isolation and helplessness they sho1ed that It 1as possible, even in 
the 1odern bureaucratic age, to llve 1ith •vitality and happiness.• 
Ries1an, hi1self, has led a life of vitality and happiness. 
He 1aa born in 1909 In Phi ladelphla 1here he gre1 up In 1el I-to-do 
Je1ish household. His fe1lniat 1other ca1e fro1 a pro1inent fa1lly, 
and his father 1aa a respected physician. He studied che1istry at 
1Ralph Ualdo E1eraon, •self-Rel lance,• E:t:tt7!1:t,, Fir:tt and 
S"cond S"rii!18_, Engl i:th Trait:t., R"P"":tt'nfat ivl!I 111.'n., llddt"tltt:ti!ltt (Hew 
York: Hearst International Library Co., 1911), 36. 
Soavid Riea1an, •The Saving Re1nant, • /ndi<1idut1li~• 
R"con:1idl!lr"d and Otht'r E:ttta!ftt (Hew York: The Free Preas, 1951), 
116-20. 
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Harvard and then switched to law. He clerked for Justice Brandeis 
and subsequently taught la• at the University of Buffalo. It was 
not unti I 1946, when he joined the faculty at the University of 
Chicago, that he began the career in sociology that ulti1ately 
secured hi1 a place in the intellectual history of the t1entieth 
century. He was at Yale briefly during which ti1e he wrote Th~ 
Lt111ttly C/'tt?fld, and today at nearly eighty he teaches at Harvard. 
Perhaps through al I of this he has de1onstrated the control over his 
own I ife characteristic of the autono1ous 1an he cha1pioned. His 
colleague Peter Rose has described hi1 in paradoxical ter1s as a 
•pro-Enlighten1ent, anti-Progressive, Ger1an-Je1ish Philadelphia 
gentle1an, Harvard don, and self-proclai1ed autono1ous 1an.•6 His 
biography gives the i1pression of 1an who •rejected the 1ap in order 
to grope his 01n 1ay.• Ries1an described a person 1ho chose to 
•grope his 01n 1ay• as a •1arginal figure,• as so1eone 1ho 1as 
unco1fortable satisfying the expectations of others 1hen they 
conflicted 1ith his own.7 
In one of his earliest articles Ries1an described his attitude 
toward I ife as an •intransigent refusal to bow to the inevitable.•6 
Hebel ieved that life Involved each individual in a struggle to 
realize and 1aintain autono1y. In no real sense •ere any of us born 
6oauid I. Rose, •oauid Ries1an Reconsidered,• St~~i~ty, 
March/April 1982, 53. 
7oauid Ries1an, •narglnal ity, Confor1ity, and Insight,• 
lndividuol i:1• R1Jcon:1idtJ1'1JD ond Of htJr E:1:1oy:1, 166-78. 
Boauld Ries1an, •rhe He• Society,• Th~ Rtlonth~, January 1939, 
96-7. 
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free. At birth each of us Inherited a •ay of life •ith accepted 
standards of thought and behavior. Ries•an argued that freedo• •as 
potentially ours, and he •as certain that each Individual had the 
capacity for uniqueness. He felt that 
the enor•ous potential lties for diversity in nature's bounty 
and 1en's capacity to differentiate their experience can 
beco1e valued by the Individual hl1self, so that he •I I I not 
be te1pted and coerced Into adjust1ent or, fal llng adjust1ent 
Into ano1ie. The idea that 1en are created free and equal is 
both true and •isleading: •en are created different; they 
lose their social freedo1 and their individual autono1y in 
seeking to beco•e I ike each other.9 
Ries1an sensed that the cost of autono1y •as too great for 
1ost people to bare. Exceptional individuals such as Bertrand 
Russell served as exa1ples of •hat •as possible.10 Society, 
ho•ever, acted to discourage autono1y through i1posing social 
character on individuals. Fe• could resist the pressures to confor1 
to the dictates of society, friends, and fa1i ly, and even fe1er 
could rebel successfully. Like Ca1us's rebel, Ries1an's autono1ous 
1an insisted •on a right not to be oppressed beyond the I i1lt that 
he [could] tolerate.•11 The individual, Ries1an argued, 1ust retain 
the right to say no. •His acceptance of social and pol ltical 
9R I es1an, TIJ~ Lon~/!/ Cro,d, 307. 
10Ries1an 1entions Russell in the Lon~/!/ Cro,d and In a 
nu1ber other places as an outstanding exa1ple of an autono1ous 
Individual. Anyone fa1i I iar •ith Russel I's career can understand 
•hy. 
11 A I bert Caius, TIJ~ R~h~I, A revised and co1p I et e trans I at ion 
of L 1Ho••~ R~volt~ by Anthony Bo•er (He1 York: Uintage Books, 
1956) J 13. 
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authority,• Riea•an declared, •ia al•aya conditional .•12 He 
possessed •hat he ter•ed the •nerve of failure,• •the courage to 
face aloneness and the possibility of defeat in one 1 s personal I ife 
or one 1 a •ork •ithout being •orally destroyed.•13 The •nerve of 
failure• represented a recurring the•e in Ries•an's 1ork, and it 
•eant si•ply the capacity to endure rejection by one's peers. 
The relationahip bet•een Riea•an and Fro•• 1 s thought •as 
co•plex. Ries1an ad1ired Fro11 and 10s Inclined to vie• his 
utopianis1 sy1pathetical ly. In •so1e observations on Co11unity 
Plana and Utopia (1917),• he declared that •a revival of the 
tradition of utopian thinking see1s to 1e one of the i•portont 
intellectual tasks of today.• He defined a utopia as a non-existing 
but potential reality. It •as rational in contrast to an ideology 
1hich •as •holly irrational and, therefore, not a potential reality. 
Utopian thought, he wrote, •as difficult and rare: •Fe• scholars 
achieve the kind of sensitive and friendly relation In reality •hich 
is necessary for utopian creation--a relation In which one respects 
'what is' but includes in it also '•hat 1ight be' ,•11 
Though the ter•s ideology and utopia •ere borro•ed fro• Karl 
Mannhei•'s ldt'tJlt~!f ond Utopia, Ries•an attached slightly different 
1eanings to the1. Ries•an noted that he 1as true to Mannhei1's idea 
of their •dialectical opposition,• but Mannhei1 had characterized 
12 RI es1an, !ha Lonaly tro•d, 251. 
13oavid Riea•an, •A Philosophy for Minority Living,• 
Individual i~• Rdcan:;Jidarad, 55. 
11oavid Rles•an, •so•e Observations on Co11unity Plana and 
Ut op I a, • I ndiv idvo Ii :t• Ra,,on:t i dttrad, 15-17 . 
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both ideology and utopia as irrational belief systems. For 
Mannhei1, a zealous com1itment to preserve the past was the heart of 
ideology, and a fervent desire for change was at the center of 
utopia. Between ideology and utopia 1as reality. The understanding 
of reality was a task for the sociology of kno1ledge. The sociology 
of knowledge ai1ed at solving the proble1 described by Mannhei1 as 
•the social conditioning of knowledge• through a sort of synthesis 
of ideology and utopia. 15 
Riesman, to the contrary, saw From• as a utopian not in 
Mannhei1's critical sense but in the sense that Fromm was able to 
see "what is," "•hat ought to be," and also 0 1hat can be." Though 
he spoke of Fro11 as a "more hopeful prophet 0 16 and drew upon 
Fro11 1 s "productive orientation• for his concept of autonomy, 
Ries1an 1 s understanding of autono1y, in contrast to Fro11's, rested 
on an assu1ption that the conditioning of individuals could be 
overco1e. Ries1an explained, 
The power of individuals to shape their own character by their 
own selection among models and experiences 1as adumbrated in 
our concept of autono1y; when this occurs, men may limit the 
provlnclallty of being born to a particular famlly In a 
particular place. To some, this offers a prospect only of 
15t::ar I Mannhe i 1, /de10/ogu ond tltoph1. Rn lnt1,1.1dut1t h.1n f 1.1 t1Je1 
Sociology of l'no•ledge (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
1952), chapter iv and v . A I so, T/Jt1 Encuc I opl!ld h1 1.1 f PIJ i h.1~1.1J1h!f, 1972 
ed., s.v. •nannhei1, Karl,• by Uerner Stark. 
16oavid Aies1an, •rhe Lonely Crowd: A Reconsideration in 
1960, • TIJl!I Socio h.1gu ,, f Cu It"'," tmd t /Jt1 llm1I11:1 l:r ,, f Stu'! h1 I 
C/Joroctsr: T/Je •orJ: 1.1! Dm1id Rit1s•tm Rt1vlt1•t?d, ed., by Seymour 
Mart in Lipset and Leo Lowenthal (Hew York: The Free Press, 1962), 
458. 
rootless aen and galloping anoaie. To •ore hopeful prophets, 
ties based on conscious relatedness aay soae day replace those 
of blood and soil, 17 
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Rles1an 1as 1orklng In an age In 1hlch the failures of Marxist 
and socialist utopias •eighed heaui ly on the ainds of intellectuals. 
The aenace of total itarianls1 •as real for thea. Hitler's Geraany 
and Stalin's Russia •ere not distant 1e1ories, but conte1porary 
events. As Richard Pella has argued, Ries1an •as genuinely 
a1bivalent about utopian solutions in general: •[his] attack on 
confor1ity contained radical i1plications fro• 1hich [he] dre• back 
because the one alternative [he] could i1agine--social is1--see1ed 
responsible for the very collectivist attitudes they condeined.•16 
Ries1an understood 1el I the bleak history of utopias although he 1as 
convinced that 1ithout utopian thinking, 1ithout 1hat he sa1 as 
realistic visions for the future, history 1ould essentially stal I. 
In a sense Ries1an sa1 utopian thought as the 1otive force of 
history. •The status quo,• he 1rote, •proves the 1ost i I lusory of 
goals.• Riesaan 1as interested In utopias as blue prints for the 
future, not 1essianic reveries. A utopian conception 1as •ti1e-
located in the future.• It 1aa a hypothesis, a conception of a 
•social order 1hich has not yet been tried, though it is a realistic 
possibility, not a 1ere Idle drea1.• He considered utopias to be 
rightful clai1s of the I iving for a better iorld.19 
171 bid. J 158, 
16R i chard Pe I 1 s, llJt.t L i bl.'1'11 I II ind in 11 C1.m~ttl'v11t ivt9 Rgtt ( tfe1 
York: Harper, 1985), 218. 
19Aies1an, •so1e Observations on Co11unity Plans and Utopia,• 
lndividvol i:1• Rl.fcon:1idl.fl'l.fd, 70. 
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In Th~ L im~lg D•1J11d, R i es11an' s most i 1port ant work, he 
i1plored his readers to "realize that each life is an emergency that 
on I y happens once. "20 IJh i I e his t hes I s i n TIJ~ L 1.m~ I!/ Ct•1.111d had to 
do with a changing A1erican character, his larger theme was the 
plight of individuals in the 1odern era. This theme was exemplified 
in his concept of autono1y. 
Ries1an's belief in autono1y recalled Alexis de Tocquevi lie. 
Ries1an felt that the modern American "willingly takes up with 101 
desires 1ithout daring to embark on lofty enterprises, of which he 
scarcely drea11s. 0 21 In fact, Riesman's entire study of the American 
character harkened back to Tocquevll le and his classic study of the 
1630s, D~1oc1•nc11 in R1~1·h~11, So•e critics of TIJ~ L1.1n~l11 Cr1.1,d have 
used Tocqueville to dispute Ries1an's thesis of a changing American 
character. So11e have argued that Ries1an and Tocquevi I le not only 
asked 1any of the same questions but also gave many of the sa1e 
ans1ers. Fro1 the start Ries1an 1as •ell aware of his Tocqueville-
ian di le11a: 
It is 1y i1pression that the middle-class American of today is 
decisively different from those Americans of Tocquevi lle's 
1riting who nevertheless strike us as so contemporary, and 
1uch of this book 1111 be devoted to discussing these 
differences.22, 
Ulth his theory of social character Rlesman explored the 
20oav id Ai es1an, The Lone I !I Cro11d, 297. 
21 Ai es1an, TIJs L 1.1ns I !I D•1.7f1d, 235. See a I so A I ex is de 
T ocquev i I I e, De1ocr11c11 in R1e1• i co, ed. , J . P. Mayer (Garden C i t y, Hew 
York: Anchor Books,1969),632. 
22tbid., 15. 
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relationship between how people live and who they are. Riea•an waa 
•ost Interested in A•ericans, although he believed that his theory 
1as •ore 1ldely applicable. He essentially tried to connect changes 
in how A•ericans lived to changes in 1ho A•ericans 1ere. Ho one 
disputed the fact that In the century after Tocqueville first 
described the equal itarianis• of Anglo-A•ericans, great social, 
econo•ic, and political changes had taken place 1hlch 1ould have 
•ade A•erican society unfa•i liar to the French1an. Uould the 
A•erican people also have been unfa1I I lar to Tocqueul I le? This 1as 
the questioned raised by Rles1an. His answer 1ade hi• fa1ous. 
R i es•an • s argu•ent In TM. L1.:vrely Crt.vd ran a s i 1p I e course, 
First, he took the differences between the 1ld-nineteenth century 
A1erica and •id-twentieth century A•erica to be self-evident. 
Second, he assu•ed that there 1as so•ething cal led social character. 
Third, he defined social character as a product of the design or 
conditions of society. Suggesting that social character had 
1aterial basis, Ries•an drew upon Erik H. Erikson and clai•ed that 
social character satisfied •the largest needs• of society and 1as a 
result of •econo•ic-historic necessities.•23 For hi•, Fro•• had 
shown that types of character existed out of social necessity. •1n 
order that any society 1ay function 1el1,• Ries1an quoted, •its 
1e•bers 1ust acquire the kind of character which 1akes the1 1ant to 
231bid., 5, citing Erik H. Erikson, •obaeruatione on the 
Yurok : Ch i I dhood and LJor I d I 1age, • Uni Vdl':t it !I 1.1 f C,1 / i ft1rn h1 
Pv'1/ icot iontt in Raa1'icon llt'c/Jao/agy ond Et/Jn1.1/agy, XXXU ( t 9'JJ), iv. 
c: c::-
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act in the way they have to act as me•bers of society."24 Fourth, 
Ries•an basically reasoned that since society had changed, society's 
needs 1ust have changed, and, further1ore, that since society's 
needs deter1ined social character, social character must also have 
changed. Ries1an in essence turned Max Ueber on his head by 
suggesting that the 1ork ethic 1as a consequence not of ideology but 
of de1ographic and econo1ic conditions. 
In lht!f L1."ll1t!fl!f D"t.wd R i es11an identified three types of 
character, "tradition-direction," "inner-direction," and "other-
direction." The three character types described three processes of 
socialization 1hich, Ries1an argued, corresponded to three stages of 
historical develop1ent. Ries1an cal led the1 "modes of conformity." 
Each distinguished a historical relationship between individuals and 
society, that is bet1een the character of individuals and society: 
Thus the link between character and society--certainly not the 
only one, but one of the 1ost significant, and the one I 
choose to e1phasize in this discussion-- is to be in the way 
In 1hlch society ensures so1e degree of conformity from the 
individuals who make it up·25 
Each character type corresponded In theory to a period of history. 
Rles1an Identified these three historical epoches in terms of stages 
on a population S curve. He proposed a causal relationship between 
changes In population and changes In character: 
tentatively seek to link certain social and characterological 
211bid., 5, citing Erich Fro11, "Individual and Social Origins 
of Neurosis,• R1s1,ic1m S1.71.-:iolagicol Rt.tvisr1, IX (1911), 380. 
251bid., 5. 
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develop•enta, aa cause and effect, •ith certain population ahifta 
In Uestern society since the Middle Ages.26 
High birth rates and death rates characterized societies at the base 
of the curve •hich •ere in the first stages of develop1ent. Such 
societies had •hat Ries•an called •high gro•th potential.• They 
•ere highly stable, tradition-directed societies. Inner-directed 
societies on the 1iddle level of the S •ere said to be in a stage of 
•transitional gro1th,• that la to say they had high birth rates but 
declining death rates. Consequently, Inner-directed societies had 
burgeoning populations. Societies entered the final stage on the 
top of the S •hen birth rates began to taper off suggesting, Ries1an 
said, •incipient population decline.• 
There 1as a close relationship bet•een the de1ographic and 
econo1ic characteristics of societies. The inclusion of econo1ic 
factors in his analysis deserves added e•phasis because subsequent 
to T~ L t.?M.l!f lh¥d R i es1an abandoned hi a popu I at I on thesis and 
revised his argu1ent. At that point his •ork suggested an A1erican 
character that resulted out of an interplay of ideology and econo1ic 
env i ron•ent. This argu1ent, i •PI i cit in T~ Lt.?M.l!f Crt.1•d, David 
Potter later developed in T~ Pttt.?pltt ,,.,f PIMf!J. In TM Lt."lfltfl!J Crt.¥d 
Ries•an believed that •it •ould be al1ost as satisfactory• for hi• 
to categorize societies according to their stages of econo1ic 
develop1ent as the econo1ist Col in Clark had done by distinguishing 
a•ong •prl•ary,• •secondary,• and •tertiary• econo•ic syste•a.27 
261bid., 7. 
27tbid., 9. 
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For exa1ple, in a society •ith •high gro•th potential,• a tradition-
directed society, people •ere occupied •Ith the l11ediate proble1 of 
group survival so they hunted, fished, far1ed, and 1ined. During 
the phase of •transitional gro•th• and of inner-direction they 
beca1e involved in production in order to satisfy the de1ands of a 
gro•ing population. During the phase of •incipient decline• and 
other-direction people •orked in trade, co11unication, and 
consu1ption. Because production levels re1ain high, de1and had too 
be sti1ulated. Thus Ries1an identified the develop1ent of a 
consu1ption-oriented society as the crucial factor In the transition 
fro1 inner-direction to other-direction. Ries1an believed that 
there •as a historical pattern to how societies insured confor1ity 
•hich he I inked to population levels. Accordingly, 
each of these three different phases on the population curve 
appears to be occupied by a society that enforces confor1ity 
and 1olds social character in a different way.26 
Ries1an's concepts of tradition-direction, inner-direction, 
and other-direction reflected the 1anner in •hich a society insured 
that its 1e1bers •ere responsive to the needs of the group. Each 
explained a 1ethod by •hich a society coordinated the actions of its 
1e1bers. In a tradition-directed society, change occurred uery 
slo•ly and children learned that things •ere as they had al•ays been 
and al•ays •ould be. In short, they learned to value social and 
cultural nor1s because they perceived the1 to haue an existence ouer 
and above individuals. In contrast, an inner-directed society •as 
26tbid., 8. 
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•arked by rapid change, and children internalized a set of core 
values that enabled the1 to function in an euer changing 
environ1ent. Ries1an likened the function of these values to a 
•gyroscope,• in that they served to keep children balanced and on 
course. Children learned to value hard 1ork, achieue1ent, and 
thrift so that they 1ould be able to survive in a co1petitive 1orld, 
a 1orld of scarcity. In an other-directed society, ho1ever, 
survival beca1e less difficult. Scarcity 1as overco1e. People 
needed to 1ork less in order to feed, cloth, and house the1selves 
and had 1ore ti1e to spend socially. Fashion arose to displace 
culture as the regulator of lifestyles. The other-directed 
confronted proble1s of a ne1 sort. Uith 1ore social ti1e 
interpersonal proble1s beca1e 1ore co11on: •increasingly, other 
people are the proble1, not the the 1aterial environient.•29 
People found the1selves needing to know how to get with along 
other people. A •radar screen• replaced their •gyroscope.• Ho 
longer single-1inded in their pursuit of econo1ic 1astery, 
individuals needed to be sensitive to al I the sti1ul i of their 
social environ1ent. The •scarcity psychology• of inner-direction 
had given 1ay to an •abundance psychology.• For Ries1an this 
explained in ter1s of character the difference between R1erica in 
the nineteenth century and A1erica 1id1ay through the t1entieth 
century. R1erlca, according to Ries1an, 1as 1oving to1ard 1hat 
Ulllia1 H. Uhite cal led a •social ethic• as opposed to a no• 
291 b I d • I 18 . 
outdated "Protestant work ethic." Rs Rlesman stated In the first 
paragraph of T/Jel L1.111t!ll!I Cr1.""1 : 
This Is a book about social character and about the 
differences in the social character between different regions, 
eras, and groups ... More particularly, it is about the way 
In mhich one kind of social character, which dominated America 
in the nineteenth century, is being replaced by a social 
character of quite a different sort.30 
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Uhi le TIJ~ L1.'7n~/y CrtJtHI was prl1ari ly a study of the 
develop1ent of other-direction In America, Rlesman contended that It 
was applicable to man In general. "My analysis of the other-
directed character," he wrote, "is thus at once an analysis of the 
A1erlcan and of contemporary man."31 The general intent of his 
argument flo1ed from the causal nature of his population thesis 
which should haue been broadly applicable. There were problems 1ith 
this thesis, which others quickly pointed out. Oscar Handlin argued 
that the population explosion In the eighteenth century century 
occurred after the characteristics of Inner-direction were already 
establlshed.32 Also, the population thesis did not explain why the 
United States 1as ahead of Britain and France In the development of 
other-direction. Both of those nations, one 1ould Imagine, reached 
the stage of "Incipient- population decline• before the United 
States.33 Further1ore, there was tension between Rlesman's concern 
30tbid., 3. 
31tbid., 19. 
32oscar Handlin, "Toward a Personal Autonomy," lh8 St1tu1'ch7!1 
Revie• al L itet'ofure, 3 March 1951, 14. 
33oau id Potter, lh8 P81.7p/8 ,,f Pl8nty (Chicago: Uni uers i ty of 
Chicago Press, 1954), 61. 
for autono•y and hie population the1i1. Could individual1 really 
hope to alter the course of •econo1lc-hlstorlc necessltles?M 
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Ries1an eventually changed his 1ind about the link he 
•tentatively• establ iehed between shifting population and changing 
character structure. For exa1ple, in a •reconsideration• written in 
1960, he clai•ed that he had not been •suggesting that the shape of 
a population pyra1id caused a particular social character to 
e1erge.•3i Clearly, however, he had so argued and afterwards, in 
I ight of criticis1, altered his position. He 1ent on to say that he 
had given •far too I it tie place to pereiatent A1erican values and 
their l1pact on the social character.•35 Rle11an 1aa responding to 
directly to criticis11 1ade by Sey1our Lipset in •A changing 
A1erican Character?•36 Lipset had argued that A1ericans in the 
t1entieth century subscribed to the sa1e values as A1ericans in the 
nineteenth century and that this continuity in values i1pl ied 
continuity in character. Uhi le Ries1an dropped his population 
thesis, he 1aintained that his perception of change 1as valid. 
By contrasting Ries1an 1ith his critics we sharpen our vie• 
of hi1. Three of his 1ore pro1inent critics 1ere the historian Carl 
Degler, the sociologist Sey1our Llpset, and the anthropologist Clyde 
Kluckhohn. They rejected Ries1an's perception of change and argued 
3ioavid Aies1an, •The Lonely Cro1d: A Reconsideration in 
1960, • Cultul'tt ond Sot:iol C/Jol'octttl', i22. 
351bid., i22. 
36sey1our Martin Llpset, •A Changing A1erlcan Character?" 
Cultul't1 and Socio/ c/1,1!'0,,ft111, 136-171 , LI peet eubeequent I y 
developed hie argu1ent 1ore fully in T/Jtt Fil':tl &, Noth.m (He1 York: 
Anchor Books, 1963). 
61 
instead that the A•erican character had shown remarkable stabi I ity. 
Degler, for instance, argued that the evidence led to a conclusion 
opposite of the one Ries1an dre1: 
There 1ay be some accentuation of certain aspects of it in our 
tl1e, but 1hat Tocquevll le designated in the 1630s as 
·de1ocrat1e· Is essentially 1hat Riesman means by other 
direction. Rather than a changing American character, the 
evidence suggests a remarkably stable one, at least since the 
early years of the nineteenth century.37 
Uhat Degler said was tantamount to arguing that there was a 
difference bet1een Americans of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries but not enough of one to constitute a change in character. 
It 1as as though he conceived of the American character as an 
Inviolate hand-1e-do1n passed fro1 generation to generation. 
Degler's position suggested that the character of a people had no 
relatlonshlp to external conditions, that llfe could change but 
people 1ould not. 
Clyde Kluckhohn made a similar assessment of the status of 
A1erlcan character when he suggested that Americans had matured 
since Tocquevllle's day. Kluckhohn further ventured that the 
differences that existed between the present and past were 
exaggerated In the 1950s because of stressful world conditions: 
The changes In A1erican values during the past generation are 
in part consequences of processes steadily affecting al I 
•advanced• industrial societies, In part the result of more 
te1porary political and econo1ic currents playing upon the 
37car I Deg I er, "Socio I og I at As HI st or i an,• Ra£t1'h.'~1n Hlsft.71'!1 
ond the Socio/ Sci~nc~s (Hew York: The Free Press, 1964), 519-530. 
,...,..., 
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1hole world.38 
Both Degler's and Kluckhohn's argu1ents seemed to be that, while the 
strength of the A1erican inclination toward mediocrity and 
confor1ls1 was stronger than ever, It was st Ill the sa1e 
inclination, and, therefore a change Ln character had not occurred. 
Their position denied the possibility of change on the basis of 
si1ilarltles between generations. The change identified by Aiesman 
did not discount similarity. 
In Thi!! F il'ttf H"' M1t hm Li pset tried to exp I a in the uniqueness 
of the United States as a consequence of the persistence of certain 
values. He argued that the commitment of the American people to two 
basic values has been sustained for over a century and that these 
values had influenced the course of the material and technological 
change that Aiesman suggested had altered the American character. 
Lipset was clearly truer to the ideal 1st position of Max Ueber, 
so1ething he pointed out and Aies1an acknowledged in the 
"reconsideration." The two values that Lipset pointed out 1ere 
"achieve1ent• and "equality," and he argued that the dialectical 
tension between the• had defined the course of American history. 
•eoth strands,• he wrote, "the equal itarian and the achievement-
oriented, re1aln strong, but changing conditions sometimes fortify 
one at the expense of the other, or alter the internal content of 
each. •39 
36Clyde Kluckhohn, "Have There Been Discernable Shifts In 
American Ua I ues during the Past Generation," !ht' liat.'t'ic~m St11ls 
(Hew York: Harper,1956), 145-217. 
39Lf pset, lhs Firttf Hs' Hot ion, 147. 
In Lipset •hat Rles1an cal led other-direction •as really an 
Indication of equal itarianis• holding sway. Lipset clai1ed that 
other-direction •as •an epipheno1enon of the A1erican equal itarian 
ethos.•iO Lipset's analysis, however, •as vague and the A1erican 
co11lt1ent to the values he Identified Inconstant, suggesting that 
the fortunes of ethos of achleve1ent and the ethos of equality 
see1ed to be related to the 1aterial and technologlcal conditions 
that Llpset wanted to dee1phaslze. The point Is that Lipset 
unintentionally buttressed Ries1an's case. Uhat Ries1an described 
as a shift in character, Lipset cal led a shift in value e•phasis. 
Perhaps this difference was explained by the fact that Lipset 1as 
not disheartened by the rising tide of other-directedness. He 
agreed with Kluckhohn, who 1rote, 
Today's kind of •confor1ity• 1ay actually be a step to1ard 
1ore genuine individuality in the United States. ·confor1ity• 
is less of a personal and psychological proble1--less tinged 
11th anxiety and gul It .... If so1eone accepts out1ardly the 
conventions of one 1 s group, one 1ay have greater psychic 
energy to develop and fulfi I I one's private potentialities as 
a unique person.41 
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In contrast to Kluckhohn and Lipset, Aies1an clearly 1as 
1orrled by the fact that people did not see1 to 1lnd being 
indistinguishable fro1 others, and it 1as the attitude that saw 
confor1is1 as a good thing that he thought 1as indicative of the ne1 
age and the 1odern character. Ull I ia1 H. Uhyte si1llarly Identified 
i01bid., 150. 
41 Ibid., 158. Also Kluckholn, "Have there been Discernable 
Shifts . . . , • T/JtJ RatJt'icon S!f1/8, 187. 
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this difference ae a new •eocial ethic.• The chief point of 
Ries1an's analysis of other-direction, ho1ever, 1as not that it 1as 
confor1ist. He did not challenge outright Tocquevil le's 
characterization of de1ocratic people. He thought that the 
tendencies Tocqueville had keenly observed had beco1e •the 1ore 
auto1atic outco1e of a character structure governed, not only fro• 
the first but throughout I ife, by signals fro• the outside.•i2 
There 1as a difference bet1een those having the sa1e internalized 
values and acting so as to get along and prosper and those not 
really having values and being regulated by the •cues• of others. 
Correctly, Ries1an did not believe that Tocquevi lie was i1plying 
other-direction. Also, it has to be re1e1bered that Tocquevi I le was 
writing 1ith an eye to the future of France so his descriptions of 
A1erica were at the sa1e ti1e extrapolations of it. This helps to 
explain, I think, the apparent ti1elessness of O,,.•ocr~n~ in liat!frici~ 
Uhat Ries1an noted about the other-directed person was his 
attitude toward hi1self and life. As opposed to the Inner-directed, 
he was content 1erely to get along. Ries1an wrote, 
They [the other-directed] are not eager to develop talents 
that 1ight bring the• into conflict; whereas the inner-
directed ~oung person tended to push hl1self to the ll1lt of 
his talents and beyond.i3 
The 1aterial a1bitions of the inner-directed 1ay not have been 
lofty, as Tocquevi lie thought, but they 1ere a1bitions al I the sa1e. 
In conclusion, Ries1an's character types 1ere not as distinct as 
i2R i es1an, Tht1 L ant!f I !I Cra•d, 256. 
i3L I pset 1 Tht1 f'it,:tt Ht1• Hot h.m, 23.it. 
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so•e critics have suggested. Change •as gradual, and it •as not 
dra•atic, and, Ries•an could have said, easily overlooked. The 
change in character, Ries•an i1plied and Potter eventually argued, 
hinged on the develop•ent of the United States into a consu1er 
society. Inner-direction and other-direction •ere different but not 
opposites. Both •ere the appropriate characters for the nature of 
their ti•e and place in history. Heither •ere autono•ous. 
Autono•y described only one •ay--for that 1atter, Ries1an 
argued, an exceptional 1ay--in 1hich people 1ay adapt to society. 
In all there •ere three •1ode of adaption• •hich Ries1an said •ere 
universal types. According to ho• a person adapted to society, he 
1as either ano1ic, adjusted, or autono1ous. Like •1odes of 
confor•ity• •1odes of adaption• •ere descriptive. Used together 
Ries1an •as able to describe society and the relationships 
individuals have •ith society. For instance, in the nineteenth 
century a typically inner-directed person was adjusted. In 1950 an 
inner-directed person was likely characterologically untypical and, 
therefore, ano1lc, 1eaning he did not have a character appropriate 
for hia ti•e and place. Ries•an explained the relationship between 
1odes of adaption and character structure succinctly: 
The •adjusted• are those who1 for the 1ost part •e have been 
describing. They are the typical tradition-directed, inner-
directed, or other-directed people--those •ho respond In their 
character structure to the de1ands of their society or social 
class at Its particular stage on the curve of population. 
Such people fit the culture as though they •ere 1ade for it, 
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as in fact they are.11 
In his general understanding of the relationship bet1een 
society and Individuals Ales1an added nothing to Fro11's theory. 
Though his typologies 1ere original, Ales1an sa1 Individuals in 
ter1s of their character as products of society. Adjusted 
individuals, he said, 1ere •1ade• for society. Since they 1ere not 
1aklng the1selves, society 1ust be aaking the1. Society, Itself, 
1as an •econoaic-historic• necessity, and Aies1an suggested that he 
could locate a society's relative historical position by Its 
deaographic traits. 
Autono1y 1as, however, the hopeful exception to this vle1point. 
An autono1ous person 1as not typical In his character. He 1as not 
tradition-directed, Inner-directed, or other-directed according to 
the nor1 in a society. He 1as a character type al I his 01n, not a 
historical type. He rese1bled the ano1ic: •for autono1y, I ike 
anoale Is a deviation fro1 adjusted patterns, though a deviation 
control led In Its range and 1eanlng by the existence of those 
patterns [of other direction and inner-direction],•15 But, uni ike 
the ano1ic, the autono1ous represented the possible transcendence of 
place and ti1e in ter1s of character. For the autono1ous confor1ity 
1as al1ays selective and tentative. Thus In the 1950s the 
autono1ous could appear at tl1es to be other-directed, in concert 
with society, and at others at odds 11th It. •His acceptance of 
social and political authority,• Aies1an wrote, •is al1ays 
11R i es1an, TM. L t.'111t!l I y l'.rt¥d, 212 , 
151bid., 219. 
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conditional. •16 
The ano•ic, adjusted, and autono•ous •ere possible during any 
of the three historical periods. Aies1an bel leved that there 1as 
little chance for autono1y In traditional societies because they 
1ere so static. Ries1an actually felt that the greatest 
possibi litles for autono1y •ere in 1odern, other-directed societies 
because affluence per1ltted people 11th the opportunity to change 
directions and adopt new I lfestyles. He cautioned, however, that 
•the very fact that his (the autono1ous person's) efforts at 
autono1y are taken as cues by 'others' 1ust 1ake hi1 conscious of 
the possibility that the effort toward autono1y 1ight degenerate 
into other-directed play-acting.•i7 The possibl llty for •other-
directed play-acting• 1ay explain why countercultures in the sixties 
turned into rigid co•1unities. 
There was tension between Fro11's concept social character and 
Ries1an's hopes for autono•y. Ries•an's conception of personal 
autono1y 1as not shared by Fro••· To Ries1an, 1hi le the influence 
of socioecono1ic conditions 1ay be extre1ely powerful, they could 
not be deter•inative in Fro••'s sense. The difficulty exieted, 
perhaps, because he 1as persuaded of the usefulness of the 
1ethodology of Fro11ian social psychology and the adroitness of its 
descriptions while at the ea•e ti1e he clung to his individualistic 
beliefs. 
Ries1an stressed the roles of utopian thinking and of autono1ous 
161bid., 260. 
171bid., 256. 
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characters in history. His e•phasis on ideas and individual action 
was incoapatible with the Fro••ian concept of social character. It 
was possible to i1agine the necessity of a particular social 
character to have been de facto, not de jure. It 1as so1ething to 
which people surrendered. Ries1an suggested that this was the 
proper interpretation when he referred to •the power of individuals 
to shape their own character,• and it was why the idea of autono1y 
1ay be rightly understood to represent a fourth, though 
indeter1inate and non historical, character type. Fromm, however, 
had explicitly cautioned against this approach when he stated "that 
the relationship between society and the individual is not simply in 
the sense that cultural patterns and social institutions •influence' 
the individual,• Riesman's interest in the individual was not 
shared by Fro11, and the mixture of Fromm's concept of social 
character with Ries1an's concept of autonomy was awkward. 
I noted earlier Joseph Gusfield's belief that Riesman•s 
concern for autono1y sounded a traditional the1e of American 
letters. The concept of autono1y ran counter to the trend in modern 
social science by positing what Gusfield called a non-sociological 
self ,i8 The sociological conception of man, according to Gusfield, 
discounted the individual and viewed a person as a "group product," 
"class character," and "institutional role."i9 Clearly Fro11's 
theory of character rested upon the assumption of a sociological 
i6Gusfield, "The Sociological Reality of America," On lloKing 
R•ericons, 52-3. 
i91bid., 52. 
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self. Thus •hen Ries1an dre• upon Fro11's study of character he 
1ixed t•o contradictory perceptions of 1an, one soclological and the 
other non-sociological. 
There Is a venerable history to the thought that lnfor1s the 
sociological vie1 of 1an including the likes of Marx and Durkhei1. 
Marx 1ay have done 1ore than anyone to shape this conception. •it 
is not the consciousness of 1an that deter1ines their existence,• he 
•rote, •but, on the contrary, their social being that deter1ines 
their consciousness.•50 Historical 1an for Marx 1as no 1ore than a 
reflection of a class role in society, itself a consequence of 
•1aterial productive forces.• He and Engels discussed ideas as "the 
phanto1s for1ed in the hu1an brain [1hich] are also, necessarily, 
subl i1itiea of the 1aterial I ife-processes, 1hich are e1pirical ly 
verifiable and bound to 1aterial preiises.•51 
In the t1i I ight of the nineteenth century Durkhei1 pub I ished 
his study of suicide as a "social fact.• He described suicide as a 
social pheno1enon I inked to a pathological (abnor1al) condition of 
society.52 Durkhei1 argued that increasing suicide rates in his day 
1ere tied to rising levels of egois1 and ano1ie, conditions 
resulting fro• either a lack of Integration into society or a 
breakdo1n of social nor1s that provide guidance. The fault lay in 
S01bid., 53. 
51Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, •The Ger1an Ideology,• Th~ 
llor~· Engld8 Rdoddr (He1 York: Horton Books, 1978), 154-55. 
52Gusfield, •The Sociological Reality of A1erica,• 53. Also 
Robert Alan Jones, E•ild Du1,Khdi• (Beverly Hi I Is: Sage 
Publ icatlons, 1986), chapter 4. 
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the failure of society's institutions to integrate or guide 
individuals satisfactorily. The point is that Durkhei•, like Marx, 
sa1 individual fates as consequences of objective social and 
historical realities. Guafield has cal led this develop•ent in 
sociological thought •the objectification of society,• a vie• of 
society that assu•es a social organization exists 1hich is real and 
has •the po1er to •ove levers that shape ... events.•53 
Fro••'s concept of social character aasu•ed that socioecono1ic 
forces predo1inated in the for1ation of personality. Ries1an's 
concept of autono1y, however, protested against this Ingrained 
sociological vie1 of 1an. Fro1 Ries1an's perspective the existence 
of an identifiable social character testified to the 1eakness of 
•ost 1en. Ries1an 1as skeptical about the chances for achieving 
autono•y, but he believed autono1y fro1 the pressures of society 1as 
possible. The concept of autono1y 1as the vital difference bet1een 
Ries1an and Fro11. It arose because they had different concerns. 
Ries1an focused on the relationship bet1een individuals and society 
1hile Fro11 e1phasized the relationship bet1een 1an and society. In 
Fro11's thought social character beca1e the key for understanding 
the regeneration of 1an. The transfor1ation of 1an 1as to fol low 
upon the transfor1ation of society as though a city designed for 
angels 1ould necessarily house angels. Man 1as sick because society 
1as sick. There 1as no roo1 in Fro11's 1orld for the exceptional 
because no one transcended his socioecono1ic condition. Fro11 
53Gusfield, •rhe Sociological Reality of A1erica,• 53. 
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1anted to exonerate 1an fro1 responsibi I ity for the evi I in the 
•orld. ThereforeJ the poasibi lity that 1an 1ight be autono1ous of 
society could not be. The exception counted 1ost for Ries1an. He 
denied Fro11's pre1ise and conclusion for the sake of Individual is1. 
Ironically, he ended using Fro11's egalitarian concept of social 
character to establish the existence of great individuals. He 
postulated a non-sociological self for the crucial very fe1. 
Uithout the burden of its population thesis Ries1an'a analysis 
offered an intriguing vie1 of the A1erican character. He indicated 
that the change fro• other-direction to inner-direction 1as clearly 
involved with the develop1ent of a conau1ption oriented society in 
A1erica. Because Riea1an 1 a analysis ended up being specifically 
about the A1erican character, his work suggested the existence of a 
unique A1erican identity. The idea of •A1erican exceptional ia1• 
interested historians in the 1950s. Taking his cue fro• Riea1an, 
David Potter inquired into the origins of the 1odern A1erican 
character. 
* * * 
CHAPTER IU 
DRUID POTTER 
In 1950 The Ualgreen Foundation Invited the historian David 
Potter to 1rlte a series of lectures on the Influence of A1erlcan 
econo1lc abundance on the A1erlcan character. Uhen he began his 
research, he discovered that the 1ork of a vast nu1ber of 
anthropologists, psychologlsts, and soclologlsts 1as related to his 
proposed study of the Aaerlcan character. 1 In his 1ork he 
ackno1ledged the Influence of several these •behavioral scientists,• 
1ost notably Margaret Mead, Karen Horney, and David Rlesaan. The 
last of these, David Ries1an, had the greatest influence on Potter's 
study of the A1erlcan character, The People of Pl~nty. For Potter, 
Rles1an sho1ed ho1 the develop1ent of the A1erlcan character 1as 
connected to the develop1ent of a consu1ptlon-orlented society. 
•one of Rlesaan's chief contributions,• Potter 1rote, ·is In tracing 
the effects of the change froa an envlron1ent that 1otlvated the 
lndlvldual as producer to one the 1otlvates hi• as consu1er.•2 
Potter bel leved that Rles1an's population thesis had co1pl lcated the 
1atter of understanding the econo1lc factor In the A1erlcan 
1Dauid Potter, Thd Pdopld of P/dnfy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 195i), vi I. 
2fbid., 57. 
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character, and he proposed to explain produceris1 and consu1eris1 as 
expressions of A1erlcan abundance at different stages of 
develop1ent. Thus Potter's 1ade explicit a thesis left i1plicit in 
Th,, L t'Vlt!f I!/ Crt'llKI. 
Ulth regards to this thesis Potter can be seen as a logical 
successor to Ries1an in the sa1e 1anner that Ries1an's 1ork followed 
logically fro• Fro11's. Like Ries1an, as 1el I as Fro11, personal 
considerations underlay Potter's Interest in the study of national 
character. Fro11's 1otivation ste11ed fro1 his experience 1ith 
evi 1--the rise of Hitler and the decline of Ger1any. Ries1an, a 
cha1pion of individual is1, used study of character to assess the 
fortunes of his Individualistic ethos in the 1odern bureaucratic-
corporate cli1ate. Potter 1as concerned 1ith his identity as an 
A1erican. A Southerner born in 1910 in Augusta Georgia, Potter was 
sensitive about his southern Identity, as 1el I as a proud A1erlcan, 
in a tl1e 1hen patriotis1 was a great concern in A1erica. During 
the years of the Second Uorld Uar and the Cold Uar he 1as driven by 
a desire to understand, and integrate, his Southern and A1erican 
identities. Uhen he died in 1971, his col leagues' In •A Me1orlal 
Resolution• aptly described hl1 as a •native Southerner 1ho 
transcended his southern heritage but never disclai1ed it .... •J 
Potter's specialty 1ae southern history and the Ci vi I Uar. 
Through his 1ork he tried to sho1 that there 1as no contradiction to 
3oon E. Fehrenbacher, Ho1ard A. La1ar, and Otis A. Pease, 
•oav id M. Potter: A Me1or i a I Reso I ut ion,• T/Jt;f .. k1t11'nol t.7f Rat;ft'lt.'~on 
Hi$fory, Septe1ber 1971, 301-10. 
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being both a Southerner and an A•erican. He did not think that the 
two identities had been antipathetic prior the Civil Uar, nor after 
it. He argued that the war between the states had not been an 
•irrepressible conflict• between divergent cultures, but rather the 
result of conflicting interests. This was the basis for his 
challenge to the historiography of the Civil Uar and Its after1ath. 
In addition to the disunion of Horth and South, he lneieted, the 
historian of the Civi I Uar had to explain their reunion. Too often, 
he held, the historian's discussion of secession overlooked the 
restoration of national sovereignty fro• 1865-1900.i He argued that 
the dissolution of the Union did not i•ply any basic inco•patibil ity 
between South and Horth. In fact, he •alntained that the Horth-
South split occurred in spite of their growing •ho109eneity,• and 
that the restoration of the Union was swift and easy because of 
this. •once the •istaken assu•ption of 1utual exclusiveness is 
accepted,• he wrote, 
the false conclusion fol lows that sectional distinctiveness 
can serve as an index of deviation, and by the same token that 
loyalty to the section can beco1e an Index of disloyalty to 
the union.5 
In Potter's work the cultural factor and the role of interest were 
not unrelated, but the fact re1ained that •within an integrated 
culture acute conflicts of interest 1ay be generated, and between 
iDav id Pott er, "The Hat ure of Southern i s1," '""' .. ~'llf /J ond f /Jt' 
Sdcf ionol Conflict (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1968), 76-76. 
51bld., 78. 
..... C" 
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diverse cultures strong co11unity of interests 1ay develop.•6 By 
explaining the origins of the Clvil Uar In a context of conflicting 
interest and not as an "irrepresslble conflict• between ways of 
llfe, understanding reunion after the defeat of the South beca1e 
less of a proble1 for Potter. It la clear that his observations 
about the Civil Uar were not unrelated to his concern for the study 
of the A1erican character. He sa• the Civil Uar as a war bet•een 
A1ericans, and for hi1, a southern A1erican, understanding the 
A1erican character--Southern as 1el I as Horthern--held special 
significance. 
A1ericana, according to Potter, •ere a people of plenty. The 
thesis of Th~ Pdopl~ of P/dnty1as that econo1ic abundance--plenty--
had conditioned the A1erican character. He devoted 1ost of the book 
to developing this thesis. The book also addressed a 1ethodological 
point. Hebel ieved that the study of national character had to be 
interdiacipl inary, and he hoped to bridge the gap bet•een history 
and the behavioral sciences-- psychology, sociology, and 
anthropology. The behavioral sciences, he believed, grounded the 
study of national character on theories of hu1an and social 
develop1ent. Ulthout the behavioral sciences history lacked •any 
1eans for analysis of the chief factor 11th which history deals,• 
na1ely 1an.7 History offered an understanding of the conditions for 
change. Thus Potter argued that 
6fbid., 79. 
71bid., xii. 
history can learn •uch about the nature of •an and society 
fro• the behavioral sciences; the behavioral sciences can 
learn 1uch about the 'external forces l•pinging upon 1an,' and 
about the nature of social change, fro• history.6 
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He felt that as a historian he could contribute to understanding of 
the larger econo1ic forces that influenced the develop1ent of the 
R•erican character. The People of Plt!lnf!J, then, analyzed the 
transition of society in the United States fro• a production 
orientation to a consu1er orientation--in David Aies1an's 
ter•inology fro1 inner-direction to other-direction.9 
Potter dre1 upon the behavioral sciences to explain the 
•eaning of national character.10 He fol lo1ed the •neo-Freudian" 
I ine of thinking developed in the 1ork of Fro••, Karen Horney, Abra1 
Kardiner, Ralph Linton and others. It is helpful to recal I the 
discussion of Erich Fro11's theory of character in chapter one 
because his definition of character helped to shape Potter's: 
Potter dre1 directly upon Fro1•'s point that 
in order that any society 1ay function 1ell, Its 1e1bers 1ust 
acquire the kind of character 1hlch 1akes the1 1ant to act In 
the 1ay they have to act as 1e1bers of the society or of a 
special class 1ithin it. They have to desire •hat objectively 
is necessary for the• to do. Outer force is to be replaced by 
inner co•pulsion and by the particular kind of hu1an energy 
1hich is channeled Into character traits.11 
Blbid., xvi. Potter 1as discussing and quoting fro1 Caroline 
Uare 's Thtf Cultural RpproodJ ta Hia1t.1rg ( 19i9). 
91bid., 59, 69-70. 
101bid., 32-72. 
lltbid., 11. Thia 1aa 1aterial that Fro11 incorporated in llt.1n 
for Hiaa~lf (He• York: Rinehart & Co1pany, Inc., 19i7). On page 
60 of !Ion for H168~/ f Fro11 1akes the sa1e point. 
...... 
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Further•ore, Fro•• defined personal lty as •the totality of inherited 
and acquired psychic qua I itles •hi ch are characteristic of one 
individual and •hich •ake the individual unique.• Uhat Potter 
proposed for the subject of national character studies •as that part 
of personality Fro11 had said •as co1posed of acquired psychic 
qualities. For Potter, like Fro•• and Ries•an, distinguishing 
bet•een •an's biological heredity and his social heredity •as 
crucial. Social psychology forged a I ink bet•een the study of 
personality and the study of society by revising (or rejecting) 
Freud's biologis•. Culture •as •the •ediu1• and personality •the 
receptor.•12 The rather sensible assertion that ho1 1e I ive 
affected ho1 1e responded to the 1orld led to the assertion that 
people 1ho shared a 1ay of I ife should respond in si1i lar 1ays to 
the 1orld, suggesting the existence of a •basic personality 
structure." 
Potter 1as i•pressed by the linking of personal lty to 
socialization in the anthropological studies of people such as Ruth 
Benedict and Margaret Mead. To Potter the develop1ent of •culture 
and personality analysis," a synthesis bet1een the fields of 
psychology and anthropology, •as one of the •epic advances of 1odern 
social science.•13 In the United States •culture and personality 
analysis• had opened ne1 doors to the study of the A1erican 
character. Thus, for exa1ple, Potter accepted Rles1an 1 s place1ent 
of the Inner-directed and other-directed character types In A1erlcan 
121bid., 37. 
131bld., 37. 
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history and did not try to devise hie own character types. As we 
shall see, Potter felt that Ries•an did not explain the reasons why 
the era of inner-direction had given 1ay to the era of other-
direction. In fact, he argued that •culture and personality 
analysis• conducted solely fro1 the perspective of behavioral 
scientists failed to understand causal factors behind changes In 
character. 
Potter believed the concept of abundance could explain 1hy the 
character of a t1entieth century A1erican differed fro1 the 
character of a nineteenth century Aaerican. In societies of 
scarcity and 1oderate abundance, Potter argued, •the social 
l1perative has fol len upon increases in production" because 
societies have either an insufficient or a barely sufficient supply 
of goods to satisfy extant desires. But in a society of abundance, 
production of goods outpaced consu1ption and therefore consu1ption 
had to be ati1ulated. "The 1oat critical point In the functioning 
of society,• he argued, "shifts fro• production to conau1ption, and, 
as it does, the culture 1ust be reoriented to convert the producer's 
culture into a conau1er'a culture.•li According to Potter when 
producers acquired capobi I ities In excess of de1ond the historical 
relationship bet1een supply and de1ond reversed itself: •the 
I i1itation has shifted to the aarket, and it la eel ling capacity 
1hich controls hie [producers] gro1th." 
1 i I b i d . , 173 I 
79 
Tiit! ht.lpll!f 1.?f P/Mlg ended up •ore or I ess c I ar i fy i ng the 
historical context of TM Lt'V1t'lg th.""'1 by e•phasizing the factor of 
abundance Instead of population. Potter also tested his theory on 
Margaret Mead's and Karen Horney's analyses of the A•erican 
character because he felt that they, along 1ith Ries•an, painted the 
sa1e portrait of 1odern A1erican character. Potter used Mead and 
Horney along 1ith Ries1an to fra•e a synthetic description of the 
A1erican character. •ora1ing these three interpretations together,• 
he concluded, • ... 1e have three treat1ents 1hich agree, or 1ay be 
construed as agreeing, that the A1erican character is in large 
1easure a group of responses to an unusually co1petitive 
environient.•15 
Potter developed his synthesis along these I ines: In Rnd ~~~P 
f'ot11' Po,d~1, Drg (Hew York, U i I I i 01 Morro• & Co, , 1912) Mead argued 
that the A1erican character 1as geared to1ard the achieve1ent of 
success, not status. In the drive for success a pre1iu1 1as placed 
upon 1obi I ity and change. Since success 1as 1easured against the 
past, success, itself, represented a break 1ith the past. People 
could no longer resort to the traditional 1ays of doing things--for 
Instance raising chi ldren--so Instead they looked to their peers for 
guidance. Mead understood pressure to1ard confor1ity as a 
consequence of a success oriented society. She suggested that the 
i11igrant origins of the A1erican population explained the A1erican 
character. She described A1erlcans as behaving I ike third-
15fbid., 60. 
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generation i••igrants. The first-generation i••igrant typically 
clung to traditional •ays, the second rejected the1 consciously and 
tried to assi•i late, and the third assi•ilated freely. In Potter's 
•ords the third generation A1erican succeeded by •perfecting his 
confor1lty to A1erican •ays and in •inning the approbation of his 
neighbors.• Potter believed that Mead's description of the A1erican 
character •as accurate, but he doubted •hether her generational 
thesis could alone explain its developient.16 
Ries1an tried to place the 1odern character in a historical 
context by I inking changes in character 1ith changing levels of 
population. Potter faulted Ries1an's population thesis because it 
did not explain •hy the French and English 1ho, he believed, had 
begun experiencing "Incipient population decline" 1uch earlier than 
the United States" 1ere not the leaders in the characterological 
evo I ut ion t 01ard other-di re ct ion. And I ast I y, in !11" Ht:'lll'l."'f le 
PNi:t1.lffl1I lty in °"'' llH, Karen Horney argued that there 1as a 
cultural basis for neurosis and that co1petitive societies bred 
rivalry, fear of others, and fear of failure. Her's 1as not a study 
of character at al I, but an analysis representative of the "neo-
Freudian• approach •hi ch Potter found useful in establishing the 
link bet•een personality and the social process. He could have used 
Fro•• to explain both the nature of social character and the social 
cause of neurosis. 
16Potter did not believe that Mead's theory held true for 
other i11igrant populations, such ae those in Quebec and Costa Rica, 
1ho did not appear to share the A1erican character. 
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Potter believed that Mead, Riesaan, and Horney shared co1aon 
ground. The analysis of each, he suggested, eaphasized •the effects 
of the spirit of coapetitlon.• Coapetitlon, he argued, 1as Inherent 
to the •success cult.• If Aaerican culture and character 1ere 
success-oriented, as Mead argued, then coapetition aust figure 
proainently in A1erican society. •Mobi I ity, he averred, •says that 
the coapetitive race shal I have no finishing post [and] confor1ity 
requires the individual to sho1 his belief in the co1petitive syste1 
not only by e1bracing its goal but also by e1bracing al I the 
physical i1pediaenta and behavior codes ... ,•17 Potter 1as a 
perceptive reader of Ries1an. He realized that Inner-direction and 
other-direction 1ere not 180 degree opposites and that both 1ere 
coapetitive orientations. One pursued econo1ic gain 1hi le the other 
1ent after social success. Potter wrote, 
In an earlier ti1e, 1hen aost 1en 1orked for the1selves and 1ere 
concerned 1ith subduing the environaent, the traits of the inner-
directed 1an--sta1ina, deter1ination, unre1itting industry-- 1ere 
at a pre1lu1 In co1petltlon. But In a society 1here the 1ajority 
now work for others, 1here service bulks large in the econo1y, 
and •here wealth is gained 1ore readily by 1anipulating other 1en 
than by further raids upon nature, the traits of popularity, 
persuasiveness, attractiveness--•personality,• as it is called--
have becoae essential coapetitiue equip1ent, and the 'other-
directed' 1an has forged to the front. 16 
Noting that Horney's analysis of 1odern neurosis was pre1ieed upon 
the deleterious effects of coapetition, Potter arrived at his 
synthetic state1ent about the nature of the A1erican character. To 
171bid., 59. 
161bid., 59. 
repeat, Potter felt that the A•erican character •as •jn large 
•easure a group of responses to an unusually co•petitlve 
environ•ent.• 
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Potter felt that the agree•ent a•ong Mead, Aies•an, and Horney 
about the nature of the A•erican character Justified his undertaking 
a study of the A1erican character and defined an approach for his 
inquiry to take. He thought that there 1as a co11on deno1lnator in 
the analyses of Mead, Ries1an, and Horney. • ... It 1ay be 
1orth1hi le: he stated, 
to consider as a deter1inant the factor of econo1ic abundance-
-not the abundance of locked-up natural resources to 1hich 1an 
lacks the technological key but the abundance of usable goods 
produced fro1 these resources-- 1hlch the people of the United 
States have possessed in far greater degree than any other 
national population.19 
Potter argued that the concept of abundance 1as 1el I suited to 
Mead's theory because the 1easure of aduance1ent In A1erlcan society 
1as econo1lc success. Ulthout an expanding econo1y characteristic 
of a society of abundance, personal fal lure, not success, 1ould be 
the nor1. For Horney, Potter clal1ed that abundance explained the 
1otluatlon underlying the co1petltiue drive she found 1as a cause of 
1ental Illness. •The entlce1ents of potential abundance, Potter 
said, •te1pt us to abandon the syste1 of status, 11th Its soclal 
bargain to trade opportunity for security, and then the absence of 
191bid., 67. 
security eets up the anxieties which Horney regards as 
characterlstlc.•20 
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Potter thought also that his abundance theory 1as l1pl iclt In 
Rlea1an'a analysis. Potter noted correctly that Ries1an associated 
Inner-direction 11th a psychology of scarcity and other-direction 
11th a psychology of abundance and aho1ed ho1 the transition fro• 
one character type to the other had para I le led econo1ic develop1ents 
In the United States. •eut once abundance is secured,• Potter 
1rote, •the scarcity psychology 1hich 1aa once so valuable no longer 
operates to the advantage of society , and the Ideal individual 
develops the qualities of the good consu1er rather than those of the 
good producer.•21 
Rid of its de1ographic aspect, Riea1an's analysis sti I I 
differed fro1 Potter's. Ries1an'a shifts in population 1ere allied 
to shifts in levels of technology. Uhi le technological develop1ent 
1aa a factor for Potter in the creation of abundance, it 1aa a 
function of 1hat Potter cal led aptitude, 1hich In co1bination 11th 
natural 1ealth produced abundance. Potter never explained the 
source of this aptitude though at one point he referred to the 
A1erican people's •notorious addiction to hard 1ork." By aptitude 
Potter 1ay have 1eant Ueber's Protestant 1ork ethic, but he 1as 
never specific. Uhat is clear la that for hi• aptitude, as a 
cultural factor, e1phasized progress and success. 
201bid., 71 I 
211bid., 70. 
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Potter's abundance thesis recalled Frederick Jackson Turner's 
frontier thesis. Potter, ho1ever, sa1 Turner as a· crude 
environ1entallst and criticized his tendency to •d1el I upon the 
pri1ary or physical environ1ent and upon such factors in It as 
geography, cli1ate, and natural resources, to the neglect of 1an-
1ade conditions that surround us.•22 Turner, according to Potter, 
1isconstrued the 1eaning of abundance by focusing too narro1ly on a 
particular 1anifestation of it, the far1er's frontier. He 
explained, 
If abundance is to be properly understood, it 1ust not be 
visualized in ter1s of a storehouse of fixed and universally 
recognized assets, reposing on shelves untl I hu1anlty, by a 
process of re1oval, strips the shelves bare. Rather, 
abundance resides in a series of physical potentialities, 
1hich have never been inventoried at the sa1e value for any 
t10 cultures in the past and are not likely to see1 of 
identical 1orth to different cultures in the future.23 
Put si•ply, Potter did not believe that Turner took sufficient 
notice of the expanding frontiers of science and industry--the bases 
for creating abundance. 
Potter's position assu1ed that the environ1ent 1as al1ays 
potentially bountiful. Ho• a people 1ent about real lzing this 
potential 1as of central i1portance. Potter interpreted Turner's 
thesis to 1ean that the frontiers1en pushed 1est, accepting a 
te1porary lo1ering of clvl llzed standards and 1eakenlng of social 
institutions, for the sake of progress in the future. Life on the 
221bid., 23. 
231 b i d . J 161. 
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frontier In turn sti1ulated lndividualis1, de1ocracy, and 
notional is1. To survive the frontiers•on hod to be capable of self-
reliance, but also In the long run he needed the assistance of the 
national govern1ent to extend clvllization 1est1ard; de1ocracy 1ore 
or less follo1ed as a 1atter of course because 1en 1ho sa1 
the1selves as equals 1ere Inclined to favor de1ocracy over other 
for1s of govern1ent.2i 
There 1ere funda1ental proble1s, according to Potter, in 
Turner's thesis. First, industrial lzation and urbanization 1ere 
pro1inent features of the A1erican landscape long before the last 
1estern lands 1ere settled. Second, If Turner 1as right about the 
role of the frontier In A1erican history and Its significance to the 
A1erican character then the end of the frontier signaled a 
revolution severing the past fro1 the present. Potter expanded the 
1eaning of the frontier In order to 1ake Turner's thesis useful in 
explaining industrialization and urbanization In the nineteenth and 
t1entleth centuries. As one frontier had given 1ay, others had 
risen to pro1inence. Potter argued that 
by failing to recognize that the frontier 1as only one for1 in 
1hich A1erica offered abundance, he [Turner] cut hl1self off 
fro1 an Insight Into the fact that other for1s of abundance 
had superseded the frontier even before the supply of free 
land had been exhausted, 11th the result that it was not 
really the end of free land but rather the substitution of ne1 
for1s of econo1ic activity 1hich ter1inated the frontier phase 
of our history.25 
2ilbid., 152-55. 
251bid., 156. 
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A belief in progreaa underlay both Potter's and Turner's 
frontier theses since It •as for the sake of progress that the quest 
for frontiers takes place.26 The idea of progress 1as central to 
understanding ho• Potter understood abundance. He defined abundance 
as •partly a physical and partly a cultural 1anlfestatlon.• He felt 
that abundance resulted fro1 the interaction of 1an 11th his 
envlron1ent. •For A1erica, he 1rote, •fro1 the eighteenth century 
to the t1entieth century, the frontier 1as the focus of abundance, 
physically because the land there 1as virgin and culturally because 
the Anglo-A1ericans of that ti1e •ere particularly apt at exploiting 
the ne1 country.•27 For a tl1e the quest for progress took the for• 
of 1estern expansion, but over ti1e 1astery of the environ1ent began 
to be realized through industrialization. Essentially, ho1ever, 
agrarian expansion and industrial expansion 1ere t10 sides of the 
sa1e coin: 
But this change in focus itself perpetuated and reinforced the 
habits of fluidity, of 1obil ity, of change, of the expectation 
of progress, 1hlch have been regarded as distinctive frontier 
traits.26 
It 1ould see1 that the habits of fluidity, 1obi I ity, and change 
1ould have been derivative of the drive for progress. Both the 
agrarian and Industrial phases reflected the drive to transform 
·natural 1ealth• into tangible ·social 1ealth.· It 1as the 
•aptitude• of a people for transfor1ing natural resources into 
261bld., 15.it-SS. 
271 bid. , 16"1 . 
261bid., 165 
useable things that 1ade abundance a reality. Thus, according to 
Potter, 
it is safe to say that the A1erlcan standard of living Is a 
resultant auch less of natural resources than of the increase 
In capacity to produce and that this 1as the result, directly, 
of hu1an endeavor--the ventures and struggles of the pioneer, 
the exertions of the 1ork1an, the Ingenuity of the Inventor, 
the drive of the enterpriser, and the econo1lc eff iclency of 
all kinds of A1ericans, •ho shared a notorious addiction to 
hard •ork.29 
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Through ingenuity and hard •ork the A1erican people created a 
secondary environaent of enor1ous •ealth. The first settlers in the 
new •orld obviously had requisite character traits for realizing the 
econo1ic potential that abounded. The result of the interaction 
between the A1erican people and their environ1ent •as 1anifest, but 
the consequences for the A1erican people in this process was not so 
evident. Uhat have been the specific affects of abundance on the 
A1erican character? To understand how abundance shaped the A1erican 
character, it was necessary to relate abundance to changes in social 
structure because Potter--! ike Fro11 and Ries1an--understood 
character as a function of society. 
Potter accepted Fro11 1 s definition of the relatlonshlp between 
character and behavior. •1n order that any society 1ay function 
•el 1,• he quoted, •its 1e1bers 1ust acquire the kind of character 
which 1akes the1 want to act In a •ay they have to act as 1e1bers of 
the society or of a special class within it.• Accordingly character 
should be defined as a social pheno1enon. It fol lowed then that the 
291bid., 89. 
influence of abundance on character ahould be inferable fro1 any 
changes that abundance had •rought on the social structure. 
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Potter began assessing the influence of abundance on the 
R1erican character by discussing the effect abundance had had upon 
R1erican values, •the for1ing and strengthening of the R1erican 
Ideal and practice of equality.• Abundance had enabled A1ericans to 
aee equality in ter1a of opportunity and not condition. Aa 
Tocqueville had noted, there •as an al1ost natural condition of 
equality in A•erica. In fact, Tocquevl I le had believed this to be 
the 1ost distinctive feature of A1erican society. Opportunity 
abounded for everyone in the for• of land. By associating equality 
with opportunity it beca1e essentially synony1ous •ith a conflicting 
value, I iberty. Citing Ries1an, Potter argued that both equality 
and liberty had co1e to 1ean the •treedo1 to grasp opportunity.•30 
•1n short,• Potter explained, •equality ca1e to 1ean in a 1ajor 
sense, parity in co1petition. Its value •as as a 1eans to 
advance1ent rather than as an asset in itself.•31 The i1portance of 
this, according to Potter, 1as that A1ericans had been co1fortable 
accepting great inequality 1hile believing the1selves faithful to 
the value equality. A1ericans had depended upon soc I al 1obl I ity to 
fulfil their drea1s for equality. Echoing Tocquevi lie, Potter 1ent 
on to suggest that the success of de1ocracy In A1erica could be 
attributed to abundance: 
J01bid., 92. See Dau id Ries1an, •Equal lty and Social 
Structure>. ..lov11n,1/ ,.,, Lttg,1/ ond A1/ it j,~,11 s,1,~i,1/,1g11, I, 19i2, 1 i I 
311bid., 92. 
He [Tocqueville] meant that a boundless continent enabled them 
to fulfil the promise of mobility. Democracy made this 
pro•ise, but the riches of North America fulfil led it; and our 
democratic system, which, like other systems, can survive only 
1hen its ideals are realized, survived because an economic 
surplus 1as auai I able to pay democracy's promissory notes.32 
Potter here argued that democracy had promised equal lty and that 
abundance had allowed for enough social mobl lity to satisfy the 
demand for equality. 
ii r~ 
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It Is clear that Potter traced his concept of abundance back 
to Deaoc1WLW Jn R~erlct1. Tocquev i 11 e had warned that democratic 
peoples •want equal lty In freedom, and if they cannot have that they 
still want equality in slavery."33 Tocquevil le's warning, of 
course, was addressed to his European audience. He had felt that 
democracy loomed In Europe's future, and he worried that democracy 
there 1ould create problems which Americans due to their 
circu1stances had been fortunate to avoid. The main circumstance 
that allo1ed American's to remain both free and equal was the 
natural endowment of Horth America. "Their fathers gave them a love 
of equality and llberty, 0 Tocquevi lie had claimed, •but it was God 
1ho, by handing a limitless continent over them, gave them the means 
of long re1alnlng equal and free.•31 
321 bid., 93. See A I ex is de Tocquev i 11 e, Deao1.-"l't1Ltf ln Raet'lco, 
ed., J. P. Mayer (He1 York: Anchor Books, 1969), 279. 
33A I ex is de T ocquev i 11 e, Deaact'OC!J ln Rae1,lc17, 506. 
311bid., 279. Potter quotes this passage out of a different 
translation which he does not cite. 
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To au• up: Potter's theory of abundance •as an elaboration 
of t•o old ideas, Tocquevi lle's and Turner's. Potter engaged in 
sweeping generalization when he spoke of the A•erican people as a 
people of plenty. The distribution of wealth in A•erica had al•ays 
been far fro• equal. He acknowledged this but contended, 
nonetheless, that •R•erica has had a greater •easure of social 
equality and social •obi I ity than any highly developed society in 
hu•an history.•35 The exclusion of blacks and native R1ericans, for 
instance, did not deny for Potter the fact that opportunities for 
social advance1ent had existed for the 1ajorlty of R1ericans, 
Tocquevi I le's Anglo-A1erlcans and subsequently other white 1ales. 
The existence of opportunity, according to Potter, beca•e the basis 
in fact for the apocryphal clal1 that A1erica •as a classless 
society. •The 1yth of equality," he wrote, •held that equal lty 
exists not 1erely as a potentiality in the nature of 1an but as a 
working actuality in the operation of A1erican society--that 
advantages or handicaps are not really decisive and that every 1an 
is the architect of his own destiny.• 
Fore1oet, abundance enabled the 1ajority of people to I ive 
co1fortably. Abundance al lowed for •outward unifor1ity," that is It 
beca1e possible for the physical differentials of traditional class 
distinctions to be abol iehed. "The factor of abundance,• he said, 
• ... has constantly operated to equalize the overt differences 
between various classes and to el l1lnate the physical differences 
35 Potter, l/Jd Pdopld of PILMl!J, 95 
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between the•.•36 Thus A1erican society had an aura of equality that 
was 1ore fiction than fact. 
In traditional class society, Potter believed, even the 
1011 iest status, conferred 1e1bership in the co11unity and a sense 
of the belonging upon the Individual. Abundance, however, by 
eli1lnating overt distinctions a1ong people burdened the1 with 1ore 
gal I Ing covert distinctions. •uhereas the principle of status 
affir1ed that a 1inor position 1ay be worthy,• he announced, •the 
principle of 1obi I ity, as 1any A1ericans have construed it, regards 
such a station both ae the penalty for and the proof of personal 
fai lure.•37 Uhi le A1ericans 1ay unfairly view those who are out of 
work or e1ployed in 1enial tasks as personal failures, it Is far 
fro1 certain 1hether the bonds of co11unity were ever tight enough 
to bestow dignity upon the serfs, peasants, and beggars of earlier 
ti1es. It was really unnecessary to debate which condition has 
resulted in greater psychological da1age, the hopelessness of the 
past or the false hopes of the present. A worse case does not 1ake 
a bad one better. Potter observed that a balance needed to be 
struck bet1een the principle of 1obi I lty and the principle of 
statue. •Abundance,• he concluded, •destroyed this balance by 
1aking a good standard of living available for any 1an, 1hi le 
perpetuating a 101 standard as usual for 1ost ien.•36 More I ikely, 
abundance reversed the i1balance rather than destroyed the balance. 
361bid., 102. 
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As had Ries•an, Potter I inked the change in character fro• 
inner-direction to other-direction to the develop•ent of a consu•er 
society. He argued that during the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century A•erican society was speedily transfor•ed itself fro• a 
production-oriented to a consu1er-oriented society. Potter felt 
that the desires of consu1ers were irrational. In so far as our 
appetites are subject to 1anipulation by others, Potter was correct 
when he said that social effect of advertising has been even greater 
than its econo1ic effect. As he 1rote, 
If the econo1ic effect Is to 1ake the purchaser like 1hat he 
buys, the social effect is, in a para I lel but broader sense, 
to 1ake the lndlvldual I Ike 1hat he gets--to enforce already 
existing attitudes, to diminish the range and variety of 
choices, and, in ter•s of abundance, to exalt the 
1aterial lstic virtues of consumptlon.39 
If Potter 1as right, the choice that A1erlcans 1ere deprived of by 
advertising 1as the choice to say no. He did not discuss at length 
the character orientation of a consu1er society because It 1as 
unnecessary, the topic already having been covered a1ply by several 
writers, in particular David Ries1an.iO 
The critical l1pl !cations of Potter's analysis of the A1erican 
character are obvious, though they see1 to have been largely 
ignored. Richard Pel Is, voicing a co11only held vle1 of Potter, has 
argued that his central 1essage 1as that A1ericans could rest easy, 
that •A1erlca enjoyed a historic exe1ptlon fro1 the Ideological and 
391 b i d ., 166 . 
iO Ibid. , 172 . 
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class convulsions of Europe. 0 11 This incorrectly interprets Potter. 
He did not suggest that I ife in A1erica was without serious 
proble1s. Actually, he i1pl ied that social life in America 1as 
deteriorating. On close reading one cannot but conclude that Th~ 
Pt't"lp/d 1.1! PIMfg demonstrated the i I I-effects of capita Ii sm on the 
A1erican character. One can fault Potter for not drawing his 
conclusion forcefully. He was hesitant about "attempting to bring 
in a verdict on the free-enterprise syste1. 11 12 
In "The Roots of American Alienation," written in 1961, Potter 
did go further, expressing Durkhei1-like concerns about the 
i1plications of a consu1er society.13 He found a profound sense of 
alienation a1ong Americans and argued that the situation was 
worsening because the soil that nurtured intimate human contact had 
eroded. •Traditionally," he wrote, 
our society 1aintained this capacity so effectively that it 
was almost taken for granted, but from the profound social 
changes of the past century or more, one of the many problems 
that have e1erged ls the impairment of many of the social 
contexts •ithin which human relationships were nurtured, and 
the resulting psychological isolation, or alienation, as it is 
called, of those •ho can no longer form adequate 
relationahips.11 
11 A ichard Pe I Is, Th" Li Ddl'a I II ind in R C1.mser11t1t l<1d Rgtt 
(He1 York: Harper & Ao1, 1985), 119. 
12tbid., 88. 
13David Potter, "The Roots of American Alienation, 11 Essays 1.1/ 
David//, P1.1ttsr Oiew York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 301-33. 
111bid., 306. 
Along these I ines he identified three factors exacerbating 
alienation. RI I three, he said, •ere consequences of the •achine 
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econo1y and specialization. First, he believed that the pattern of 
social organization had changed. Pri1ary groups •hich fostered 
1eaningful personal relationships such as fa1i ly, neighborhood, and 
church no longer played the i1portant roles they once had. Second, 
he felt that econo•ic concentration and interdependence had robbed 
•ork of the 1eaning it once held. Third, he argued that 
relationships had beco1e rationalized, that is indirect and 
frag1ented--in su1, depersonalized. 
Potter held that R1erican values of equal itarianis1 and 
individual is1 •ere an i1portant source of alienation because they 
inspired distrust of society. Uhi le conservatives and I iberals 1ay 
have defined differently the threat posed by society, they agreed 
that society •as a 1enace to so1e rights of the individuals. •Thus 
al I parties,• he contended, 
have joined in celebrating the individual, 1hether as a go-
getting exponent of the free enterprise economy or as 
dissenting exponent of 1inority rights. And accordingly al I 
have distrusted the group. The I lberal, In the tradition of 
Rousseau, regarded society as a source of corruption, •hile 
1an apart froa society •as Innocent. The conservative 
regarded any heavy e1phasis upon the •elfare of the group as 
'social is1' or 'col lectivis1••45 
Potter, as historian and as student of the A1erlcan character, cared 
deeply for his country and its citizens. His •ork •as neither an 
undue celebration nor a 1indless criticis1, but, rather, a carefully 
iS 1 bid. J 330-31 . 
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constructed portrayal of the A•erican people. Potter, I ike Ries•an 
and Fro••, wrote fro• a personal perspective. Uorrled--horrlfied In 
the case of Fro11--by what they saw In the world, al I three sought 
answers for their troubled 1orlds. Fro•• hoped to sustain the 
stricken 1asses 1ith a utopian vision. Ries1an hoped to encourage 
the beleaguered individualist. And Potter hoped to draw the bonds 
of co11unity •ore tightly. Uith differing views of the 1orld, 
though sharing a 1ethod of analysis, these 1en together represent an 
enduring 101ent In the intellectual history of this century. 
* * * 
CHAPTER U 
COHCLUSIOH 
The task of this thesis has been to exa1lne the study of 
national character through the 1ork of the psychologist Erich Fro1m, 
the sociologist David Rles1an, and the historian David Potter. 
have tried to provide a crltlcal exegesis of the three thinkers and 
to relate the1 to one another by discussing the Interconnections In 
their thought. I began 11th Fro11 1 s social psychological theory of 
character, turned to Rles1an's theory of sociology, and ended 11th 
Potter's theory of American history. Each I argued had to be 
understood in the context of his time, a period of history 1arred by 
1ar, death ca1ps, Hitler's national soclal Ism, and Stal In's 
co11unls1. 
I began with Fro11 because he provided a theoretical structure 
fro1 1hlch It was possible to approach David Rles1an's Ideas about 
the A1erlcan character. In turn Rles1an served as a springboard to 
Potter, because Potter's work on the A1erican character elaborated 
upon Rles1an's 1odel, 
Fro11, a German, Je1lsh e1lgrant, used psychology to reconcile 
hl1self to a 1orld he bel leved 1as consu1ed by evl I, A leader In 
the develop1ent of •neo-Freudlan• psychology, he tried to save the 
world 11th psychology. His hatred of the world around hi1 1as 
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coupled 1ith a boundless faith in the goodness of 1an. The task of 
his theor~ of character 1as to explain the social origins of evi I 
and, thus, sho1 his audience that it 1as possible for 1an to alter 
the course of history. Man 1ould return to his natural, uncorrupt 
state, according to Fro11, 1hen society 1as transfor1ed into 
co11unity founded upon principles of love and fairness. Thus in 
Fro11 1 s thought there 1as a utopian the1e Joined to a 1ethod of 
analysis 1hich explained the psychological bond of 1an to society. 
Fro11 1 s 1ethod of analysis proved useful to Ries1an. The I ink 
bet1een 1an and society 1as character, and through the concept of 
character the analysis of society beca1e a study of personality. 
Thus social analysis provided a 1odel of the personality or 
character of a people. A concern different fro• Fro11 1 s 1otivated 
Ries1an 1 s interest in the study of character. The fate of 
individualis1 in Cold Uar A1erica, not the fate of good in the 
1orld, 1orried Ries1an 1ost. Ries1an developed the concept of 
autono1y to address the proble1 of individual is1. Autono1y 
suggested that it 1as possible for the individual to free hi1self of 
his socially prescribed character. To assess the chances for 
autono1y he devised a historical 1odel of the A1erican character. 
l1portantly, Ries1an I inked the transition period to econo1ic 
develop1ents. He associated the change fro1 •inner-direction• to 
•other-direction• 1ith the develop1ent of the United States into a 
consu1er-oriented society. 
David Potter, Influenced by Riea1an 1 a study of the A1erican 
character, elaborated upon the econo1ic orientations of Minner-
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direction• and •other-direction.• He proposed the thesis that the 
econo•ic abundance of Horth A•erica had influenced the develop•ent 
of a unique A1erican identity. The then popular the1e of •A1erican 
exceptional is•• ran through in his 1ork. The concept of econo•ic 
abundance harkened back to both Tocqueville and Turner 1hose 1orks 
1ere vie1ed 1ith rene1ed enthusias1 by scholars during the 19i0s and 
50s. 
The Idea of •A1erican exceptional ia1,• consciously cultivated 
by Potter, lay beneath the surface of Ries1an's analysis of the 
A1erican character, as 1el I, Uhi le Riea1an tried to associate the 
character of A1ericans 1ith the character of other Uestern Europeans 
through his populat Ion thesis, Th~ Lan~l!I c,,,,,d really suggested 
the nature of •A1erican exceptional is1,• as it 1as developed by 
Potter. In fact, the study of the A1erican character proceeded upon 
an assu1pt ion of •A1erican exceptional is1." This, I think, helps to 
explain the short-I ived popularity of such studies. By the late 
1950s as A1erican intellectuals began to rethink the politics of the 
Cold Uar, they began to rethink also the idea of •A1erican 
exceptional is1." Uriting in 1959, John Higha1 exclal1ed, 
In contrast [to progressive history] the ne1 look of A1erican 
history is strikingly conservative. More than at any other 
tl1e before, historians are discovering a placld, unexciting 
past .... As Tocquevl Ile did 1ore than a century ago, 
today's historians are exhibiting a happyland, adventurous In 
1anner but conservative In substance, and --above all--
re1arkably ho1ogeneous. 1 
1 John Hi gha1, • Ho1ogen i zing our Hi story, • Ct1••t!fnt at'!J, February 
1959, 9'1. 
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The study of the A•erican character •as a casualty of the political 
controversies in the 1960s. Consciousness of blacks, other 
1inorities, and 101en and their absence fro1 theories and studies of 
national character 1ade these studies offensive to 1any. 
Higha1, ho•ever, eventually 1uted his criticis1. By 1970 he 
had decided that "the idea of an A1erican consensus enabled us to 
take seriously the concept of national character, •hich had been 
unjustly denigrated for several decades.•2 He •as right, but sti I I 
there see1s to be I ittle interest in the 1ork of Potter and Ries•an 
on this score. Recently, Richard Uight•an Fox has argued that a 
reappraisal of Potter's •ork is overdue. Fox, noting that Potter 
e1phasized the ideological center of culture, suggested that at 
present historians pay too 1uch attention to groups 1ithin society 
and overlook the "values ideas, and practices that al I [these] 
social groups share in varying degrees."3 He added that Potter 
tried to sho• that A1erican culture was a process •hich Nholds 
A1ericans together, even as it enforces a stark differentiation of 
status and wealth."1 I think that Fox la right about Potter, and I 
a1 led to dra• an ironical conclusion about A1erican society and the 
A1erican people. The heterogeneity of A1erica is 1ore apparent than 
real, and the appearance 1ay ste1 fro1 the extre1e ho1ogeneity of 
the A1ericon ideofogy. The e1phasis placed upon group identity 1ay 
2John Hi gha1, Jlrit ing &e11i,~an Hi~ft..,,,!J (BI 001 i ngton: Indiana 
University Press, 1970), 159. 
3Richard Uightaan Fox, "Pub I ic Culture and the Problem of 
Synthesis,· The "1,.,u1,nol ,.,, Raerir:~m Hi~h.,rg, June 1967, 113. 
1tbid., 113. 
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•ell be an expression of A1erican Ideology. •Groupls1• 1ay •ell be 
ho1 A1erlcans grasp at liberty and equality, ho1 R1erlcans grasp at 
opportunity. It •as, after al I, Tocqueville's opinion that 
A1ericans •ere predisposed to •groupis1• and had a special talent in 
•the art of association.• •As soon aa several A1erlcana have 
conceived a sentl1ent or an idea that they •ant to produce before 
the •orld,• Tocqueville •rote, •they seek each other out, and 1hen 
found, unite.•5 
* * * 
SR I ex I a de Tocqueu 111 e, Ottaocr11cy In llatt1•h111, ed, , J, P, Mayer 
(He1 York: Anchor Books, 1969), 516. 
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